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ABSTRACT
This dissertation comprises of two essays on property rights and financing. The two es-
says have tight relationship under the broad theme of intellectual property rights of firms.
The first essay focuses on property rights within firms, between firms and employees, whereas
the second essay focuses on property rights between firms.
The first essay examines how increasing firms’ ownership of employee patents affects debt
financing. I exploit a Court of Appeals Federal Circuit ruling that shifted property rights
to employee patents from employees to firms, and find that firms’ debt financing increases
by 18%. The increase is attributable to firms’ more efficient and productive use of patents,
which improves the pledgeability of patents as collateral. I further show that a reduction in
holdup problems increases synergistic value of patents through enhanced asset complemen-
tarity, inventor collaboration, and innovation productivity.
The second essay uses novel hand-collected patent litigation data from 2000-2006 to
show that patent litigation has important financial and real impacts on firms. We find
that defendant firms experience declining financial flexibility and innovation activities, and
shift innovation strategy to pursue more exploitative projects. The product market overlap
exacerbates financial constraints of defendants in intra-industry litigation, whereas a large
reduction of litigation probability when pursuing exploitative innovation intensifies narrower
innovation scope for defendants in inter-industry litigation. We sharpen our results by in-
strumenting the probability of being sued and the timing of patent litigation using China’s
participation in TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) agreement.
Lastly, we find suggestive evidence that patent litigation has spillover effects on other non-
litigated firms in the industry.
x
CHAPTER I
Property Rights and Debt Financing
1.1 Abstract
I examine how increasing firms’ ownership of employee patents affects debt financing. I
exploit a Court of Appeals Federal Circuit ruling that shifted property rights to employee
patents from employees to firms, and find that firms’ debt financing increases by 18%. The
increase is attributable to firms’ more efficient and productive use of patents, which improves
the pledgeability of patents as collateral. I further show that a reduction in holdup prob-
lems increases synergistic value of patents through enhanced asset complementarity, inventor
collaboration, and innovation productivity.
1.2 Introduction
Patents are important assets to knowledge-intensive firms in part because of the growing
use of patents as collateral to access debt financing.1 The ownership of patents produced
by corporate inventor-employees is determined by invention assignment agreements in prac-
tice. These contracts are inherently incomplete given the highly complex, uncertain, and
long innovation processes, and, as a result, induce holdup problems and inefficiencies in how
1Loumioti (2013) documents that the percentage of secured syndicated loans collateralized by intangible
assets grew from 11% to 24% over the 1997-2005. Mann (2017) reports that 38% of US patenting firms had
pledged their patents as collateral at some point in 2013.
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the patents are managed and utilized depending on who owns the patents. Therefore, the
allocation of patent ownership is important for debt financing not only because firms need to
be in possession of the patents to pledge them as collateral but also because the ownership
structure changes the efficiency and productivity of underlying innovation processes, which
in turn affect the pledgeability and value of patents to lenders.
The goal of this paper is to empirically examine how the property rights allocation be-
tween firms and employees affects debt financing. The patent assignment agreement between
firms and inventor-employees provides a well-defined setting for examining property rights
on a narrower subset of corporate assets. However, an empirical identification of the effect
of property rights on debt financing poses a key challenge. The potential endogeneity is-
sues arise because property rights are not randomly assigned, and any unobserved variables
that drive property rights allocation may also be correlated with firms’ debt financing deci-
sions. In particular, firms with greater investment opportunities may enforce their property
rights more and, at the same time, require greater financing to materialize the opportunities.
Without a clean empirical setting, an observed correlation between property rights and debt
financing is difficult to interpret.
To overcome the identification challenge, I exploit a Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (CAFC) ruling in 2008, which, de facto, shifted property rights to patents from
inventor-employees to firms in eight pro-employee invention assignment states.2. The main
regression relies on state-level variation in the property rights enforcement through invention
assignment agreements in a difference-in-difference setting. The regression estimate captures
an increase in the leverage ratio of the treated firms in the eight states relative to control
firms after the court ruling. Both the timing and context in which the decision was made
were relatively free from the influence of lobbying, political pressure, or local economic con-
ditions, and thus provide a plausible causal interpretation of the regression estimates.
I first estimate the effect of increasing property rights on firms’ debt financing, as mea-
2The eight states include CA, DE, IL, KS, MN, NC, UT, WA. The background under which these eight
states became pro-employee state is explained in Section 1.3.1.
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sured by total debt-to-assets ratio. I find that firms in the eight treatment states affected
by the CAFC decision increase total debt-to-assets ratio by 2.5 percentage points relative
to firms located in control states. The economic magnitude of the difference-in-difference
coefficient is equivalent to an additional $62 million total debt for firms in the treated states,
following the increase in property rights. For a pre-treatment average total debt-to-assets
ratio of 0.14 for the treated firms, it is an 18% increase in the ratio. This key result stands
up to a range of robustness checks. To show that the actual issuance increases, I reestimate
the regressions using new long-term debt issuances as a dependent variable, and I find about
a 23% increase in the issuance. In a falsification test, I verify that the debt financing results
are not found in non-patenting firms, which should not be affected by the court ruling for
their lack of use of invention assignment agreements. In addition, I show that my results
stand up to robustness tests on a subsample of firms located only in the headquarter state
to rule out spurious effects by multi-state firms.
I further examine what types of debt are issued after patent ownership shifts to firms.
As the number of pledgeable patents increases, firms’ access to bank debt secured by assets
would increases as large banks appear most frequently as security interest holder on assign-
ments of pledged patents. Consistently, I find that long-term debt increases significantly
while short-term debt barely changes. The move away from short-term debt to long-term
debt is indicative of creditors’ willingness to extend long-term debt as the existence of col-
lateral mitigates borrower risk, such as opportunistic behaviors by managers, for lenders. I
then explore whether heterogeneity in access to debt financing prior to the court decision
matters and find that the existence of some debt helps more when patent ownership shifts
to firms. It appears that the underlying innovation process that generate pledgeable patents
is important, whereas the marginal effects from financial constraints prior to treatment is
minimal. The firm ownership of patents reduce holdup costs of innovation, and firms benefit
from more synergistic use of patents in innovation process. Consistently, I find that multi-
segment firms that benefit from the scope of underlying innovation process also experience
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greater increase in debt financing. This result leads to further investigation of changes in
underlying innovation process.
Next, I provide additional tests on underlying channels that reinstate the main result.
The firm ownership of patents is likely to increase the return from the innovation process and
pledgeability of patents for two reasons. First, firms have comparative advantages in manag-
ing, providing resources, and commercializing patents. Second, firms’ common ownership of
patents reduces holdup cost and allows firms to maximize synergies from larger portfolio of
patents. This is much so in today’s innovation environment, where a final product incorpo-
rates many different components,3 and large value is derived from synergies among patents.
In support, I find stronger increasing debt financing effects on firms operating with multiple
business segments, which benefit from the economies of scope. Thus, I further examine how
synergistic innovation process is gauged from growing asset complementarity, which in turn
helps increase patent pledgeability both in quantity and quality.
One way to measure the improvement in asset complementarity under the firm ownership
of patents is to use patent citations because they convey information about linkages between
innovations, inventors, and assignees (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg , 2005). I use self-citation
(citation made to patents owned by the same assignee) to capture how firms tap into its
own resources and utilize existing technology collectively. I find that, post treatment, the
self citation rises by 15% for an average treated firm. Another measure of complementarity
is how inventors collaborate on producing patents. Hart (1995) points out that integration
changes the incentives of parties to reveal information and cooperate. I use the number
of inventors assigned to each patent as an inventor collaboration measure and find that it
increases by 5% for an average firm in treatment states after the shift in the property rights
to firms.
Next, I show that both the rising asset complementarity and inventor collaboration bol-
ster pledgeability of patents by increasing productivity, efficiency, and economic value of
3The average number of patents to make one product varies from five for small molecule drugs in phar-
maceuticals (Ouellette, 2010) to hundreds for a laptop computer (WIPO).
4
patents. I use the number of granted patents, the number of granted patents per dollar
spent on R&D, and counts of external patent citations as measures of productivity, innova-
tion efficiency, and patent quality. I find that the number of granted patents and per dollar
number of granted patents increases by 15% and 0.14 for the treated firms relative to the
control firms. The citations received from other firms prove the economic value of the cited
patents to external innovation (Parchomovsky and Wagner , 2005) and also confer redeploy-
ability value as collateral (Chava, Nanda, and Xiao 2017, Hochberg, Serrano, and Ziedonis
2017). I find that citations received by the existing patents and the new patents increase
by 51% and 8% per patent, respectively. Overall, the citation results exhibit the growing
economic value of existing and new patents, based on the changes in patent quality, and
the increasing productivity captures the growing number of pledgeable patents as collateral.
The rise in patent pledgeability is corroborated by larger increase in the average number of
patent pledged as collateral by treated firms in comparison to control firms, shown in Figure
1.2.
In sum, this paper presents results indicative benefits arising from the firm ownership of
patents. The firm ownership leads to more productive and efficient use of the patents, and
the resulting increased value of patents to lenders allows the firms to raise more debt financ-
ing. These results are broadly consistent with the main implication of the property rights
theory (Hart , 1995), that a party with greater influence on the value of the asset should
own it. However, it is difficult to provide clear predictions on the optimal form of financing
contracts or optimal capital structures under the current setting, where the invention assign-
ment agreement describes the relationship between the firm and its employees, not between
the firm and financiers. Nonetheless, it may still be of some interest to explore whether the
increase in property rights also affects the issuance of new equity. In unreported analysis, I
find that there is no sizable statistically significant effect on seasoned equity offerings of the
sample firms.
This paper contributes to a few strands of related literature. Recent property rights
5
studies that focus on innovation use firm-level vertical integration decisions with regards to
the relative importance of R&D investment. Using a sample of UK firms, Acemoglu, Aghion,
Griffith, and Zilibotti (2004) explicitly show the diverging incentives for integration, depend-
ing on the relative ex ante investment intensity. They find that a backward integration is
negatively correlated with higher (lower) supplying (producing)-industry technology inten-
sity. Similarly, Fresard, Hoberg, and Phillips (2017) show that a vertical integration is less
likely in the industries where innovation is in an early stage and R&D spending is large, since
the returns are best protected under separate ownership when the investment by technology
developers is more important. Whereas both studies focus on the ex ante determinants of
integration, this paper highlights ex post changes in innovation processes subsequent to a
shift in asset ownership structure.
This paper also builds on the growing literature in patent collateral and debt financing.
Mann (2017) documents the use of patent collateral and empirically shows that, everything
else constant, stronger creditor rights on patent collateral lead to greater access to debt
financing and R&D investment for knowledge-intensive firms. Chava et al. (2017) provide
complementary results that provide evidence on how the value of patent collateral is priced
in bank loans. Hochberg et al. (2017) document an increasing venture lending to startup
firms when the liquidity of secondary markets for patents increases. The key distinction in
this paper is that the improved access to debt financing critically hinges on the ownership
structure of the patents and also depends on organization structure.
Lastly, this paper is related to inventor incentives and innovation. In a closely related
paper by Hvide and Jones (2016), the authors exploit a similar empirical setting in Nor-
way and conclude that the shift in property rights to patents from researcher to university
led to a large decline in the rate of start-ups by university researchers. The quantity and
quality of innovative output by university researchers also declined. These divergent results
may be attributable to the institutional differences between universities and corporations.
The relationship-specific nature of innovation, inventor-specific employment contract, and
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compensation schemes between the firm and inventor-employees may have limited decline in
inventor-employee incentives from outweighing the benefits of reducing holdup costs borne
by firms. This paper is also consistent with claims that inventor human capital is an im-
portant input into firms’ innovation process (Liu, Mao, and Tian, 2017) and that the lack
of inventor-specific union may have limited the reduction in inventor-employee incentives
(Bradley, Kim, and Tian, 2017), resulting in a net benefit in terms of patent pledgeability.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.3 explains empirical strat-
egy of this paper using pre-invention assignment agreements. Section 1.4 outlines the hy-
potheses. Section 1.5 describes the data in detail. Section 1.6 presents main results, Section
1.7 provides discussions about the results, and Section 1.8 presents additional robustness
tests. Section 1.9 concludes the paper.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
1.3.1 Pre-invention Assignment Agreements
In this paper, I focus on the property rights to patents arranged by a contract written
between corporate inventor-employees and their employer firms. A pre-invention assignment
agreement is an employment contract that obligates an employee to assign to the employer
all interest in any future inventions conceived during the employment term. This contract is
prevalently used and required to be signed by technical employees, engineers, and researchers
(Cherensky 1993, Pisegna-Cook 1994, Mattioli 2011). The scope of the pre-invention assign-
ment agreements may be broad enough to cover more categories of inventions than just
employer-specified inventions and extend beyond the terms of employment, for a reasonable
period after employment has ended. As a part of employment contracts, the pre-invention
assignment agreements are governed by state laws. When present, pre-invention assignment
agreements supersede common laws (the default rule in absence of such agreement), and
courts generally honor the agreements.
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In the early 1990s, eight states enacted state legislation4 to protect inventor-employees
from employers’ abuse of their superior negotiation positions, limit the scope of employ-
ers’ claims on employee inventions, and help clarify conditions under which a pre-invention
assignment agreement is considered effective (Pisegna-Cook 1994, Howell 2012). The in-
ventions that fall under the protection of the state legislations most likely arise from the
“general inventive employees5 (e.g. software engineers),” who perform general research or
design work and are subject to specific inventive employment, but no specific inventions or
end results are contemplated. The inventions from general inventive employees tend to be
a gray area because these employees may be encouraged by the employer to pursue their
creative instincts, even though they may diverge from assigned work.6
There are several advantages of using pre-invention assignment agreements in this pa-
per. First, although property rights to any assets used for production nevertheless provide
implications for debt financing, as highlighted in the introduction, the growing role of knowl-
edge assets as collateral for securing financing motivates patents as a timely and appropriate
venue for this study. Second, pre-invention assignment agreements are prevalently used
in knowledge-intensive firms, and explicitly define the division of ownership over patents.
Lastly, the existence of a plausibly exogenous shock on the interpretation of invention as-
signment contracts helps establish a causal inference and quantify the effect of strengthening
firm ownership of employee patents. Empirically showing the equilibrium outcome and es-
tablishing a causal relationship between property rights and debt financing of a firm are
challenging because the allocation of property rights is endogenous. Before I explain the
4California, Cal. Lab. Code §§2870-72 (1994); Delaware, Del.Code Ann. tit. 19, §805 (1993); Illinois, Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 765, para. 1060/2 (1994); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. §44-130 (1993); Minnesota, Minn. Stat.
Ann. §181.78 (1994); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§66-57.1-2 (1994); Utah, Utah Code Ann. §§43-39-1
to -3 (1994); Washington, Wash. Rev. Code §§49.44.140-.150 (1994)
5The other ends of the employment type spectrum are “specific inventive” or “employed-to-invent” em-
ployees and “non-inventive” employees (Gullette, 1980). Since specific inventive employees’ work serves
specific purpose of inventing defined process or product, once the goal is achieved, the employer is entitled
to the invention. On the other hand, the work of non-inventive employees, such as shop or manufacturing
as well as non-technical employees, does not involve any expectation of inventive activity.
6For example, Google is known for encouraging its engineers 20 percent of their paid time to work on pet
projects.
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quasi-experiment setting in Section 1.3.2 and 1.3.3, I provide an example of a use of pre-
invention assignment agreements.
Recently, pre-invention assignment agreements have become widely used throughout an
organization regardless of an employee’s likelihood of inventing (Mattioli , 2011), and over-
whelming employer claims on employee inventions7 have raised concerns. Firms increasingly
take advantage of the protection provided by pre-invention assignment agreements. For ex-
ample, Ford has initiated a companywide innovation challenge and encourages its employees
from any part of the business to participate by submitting invention ideas on new products
or changes to the company’s existing offerings.8 The contest rules require a submission of an
invention disclosure form (a pre-invention assignment agreement), which says “Each entrant
will assign and Sponsor will hold exclusive right, title and interest in all inventions or other
materials submitted and, in all revenue, profits and Net Proceeds generated as a result of
commercialization of a Submision[...].”9 The company claims that, from the start of the
first challenge in January 2015, more than 4,500 Ford employees have submitted invention
ideas and nearly 3,500 first-time inventors have participated in the event. This example il-
lustrates two important aspects of the pre-invention assignment agreements. The first is the
broad use of the agreement across all employment types, and the second is the important
role of the law’s interpretation of such agreements when disputes over property rights on
aforementioned general inventive employee inventions arise.
1.3.2 Institutional Setting
An analysis of how the property rights allocation causally affects firms’ debt financing
requires a plausibly exogenous change in property rights that is uncorrelated with firms’ debt
financing decisions. In 2008, the Court of Appeals Federal Circuit (CAFC) made a decision
7The Economist, Dec. 14, 2013. “Ties that bind”; The New York Times, Apr. 13, 2014. “My Ideas, My
Boss’s Property”
8The Washington Post, Dec. 14, 2016. “How Ford turned thousands of employees into inventors”
9The Ford innovation contest rules are available on http://henryfordinnovation.com/challenge/contestrules/
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in DDB Technologies LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP10 on a pre-invention assignment
agreement case that shifted property rights to employee inventions from employees to firms,
resulting in more pro-employer trends toward invention assignment agreements. CAFC cases
are heard by a panel comprised of three judges who are selected randomly, which minimizes
potential political influences. In addition, CAFC case sessions are generally held in Wash-
ington, D.C., which further limits the possible impact of local state economies on the court’s
ruling.
The CAFC decision on DDB Technologies LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP had three
main parts (Hedvat , 2011). First and foremost, despite the fact that employment contracts
are governed by state laws, the court ruled that provisions regarding patent assignment will
be regulated under federal law. The significance of this statement is that this would preempt
the pro-employee state legislations of the eight states and create uniform standards on patent
assignment provisions. Second, employers are granted authority over patents when express
language is provided in employment contracts. This means that making claims over em-
ployee inventions would become easier by including expressive terms, such as “agrees to and
does hereby grant and assign...,” “assignment of inventions,” and “ownership of discoveries,”
in the invention assignment agreements. The practical influence of the court’s ruling can
easily be found on law firms’ advice at the time to corporate clients. The law firms explicitly
recommended that their corporate clients include express phrases in invention assignment
agreements.11 For example,
“The DDB Technologies decision should provide comfort to employers that the
effect of language assigning patents in employment agreements will be interpreted
uniformly pursuant to federal law and will not be subject to differing interpreta-
tion under varying state law. The decision creates a roadmap to which employers
10517 F.3d 1284, 1290 Fed. Cir. 2008
11For additional discussions written by law firms, see “Employer and employee ownership of intellec-
tual property. Not as easy as you think” available at http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-
products/news-views/corporate-counsel/employer-and-employee-ownership-of-intellectual-property-
not-as-easy-as-you-think; “Ruling Will Guide Employers’ Rights to Inventions” available at
https://www.law360.com/articles/48989/rulingwillguideemployersrightstoinventions
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can be reasonably certain that if their employment agreements contain language
that expressly assigns rights in existing and future inventions, this assignment
language will be interpreted under federal law to vest automatically ownership
of the inventions with the employer, regardless of the state law governing the
agreement or the domicile of the employee.”12
Third, the fact that CAFC has nationwide jurisdiction and that the court categorized DDB
Technologies case as a precedential case indicate that the effects of the decision made in
DDB Technologies LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LLP have impacts on immediate future
pre-invention assignment agreement cases. In summary, the decision ruled by the CAFC
effectively increased property rights to employee inventions for firms in the eight formerly
pro-employee states. In the following section, I explain the implementation of this empirical
setting in regression analyses.
1.3.3 Methodology
I exploit the CAFC decision in 2008 as an exogenous shock in a difference-in-difference
framework. I define firms with headquarters located in the eight states affected by the court’s
decision as treated firms. I use the state of headquarter as a definition of state because
“Generally, the state where the employer is located or where the job duties are performed
will be a reasonable choice of law and likely be honored” (American Bar Association, 2014).
I present a few example cases in the Appendix A.2 to verify that the headquarter state is
indeed a reasonable indicator for treatment state. For all firms, post-treatment period is
defined as years on and after 2008.
The main regression specification is as follows.
Total debt/Assetsit = α + β treati × postt + δi + γt + it
12The full discussion is available at http://www.kramerlevin.com/Federal-Circuit-Supplants-State-Law-
to-Interpret-Patent-Assignments-in-Employment-Agreements-11-06-2008/
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The main regression dependent variable is total debt-to-assets ratio as a measure of a firm’s
level of debt financing. The total debt is a sum of long-term debt and short-term debt.
treat and post terms are included in the regression but both get dropped because each term
is collinear with firm fixed effects and year fixed effects, respectively. An important iden-
tification assumption for the difference-in-difference (DD) estimate, β, to be consistent is
that, absent treatment, the change in the total debt-to-assets ratio for firms in the treat-
ment states would not have been different than the change in the same ratio for firms in the
control states. To provide some evidence of this parallel trend assumption, I present a visual
inspection of the parallel trends in Figure 1.1.
Under the identification assumption, the DD coefficient captures the additional changes
for firms in the treatment states, relative to firms in the control states, following the shift
in property rights after the 2008 CAFC decision. In addition to firm and year fixed effects
presented in the above specification, I use firm and industry-year fixed effects to rule out
potential unobserved heterogeneity across industries over time and get a more precise esti-
mate. Lastly, I include error clustering at state level to correct for potential error correlation
within the same state and account for serial correlations in the dependent variable.
1.4 Hypothesis Development
1.4.1 Debt Financing
An important implication of the property rights theory (Hart , 1995) is that, when assets
are complementary, some form of integration is better than separate-ownership. However,
the trade-offs in the incentives of parties acquiring and relinquishing the asset ownership
make the optimal asset ownership structure dependent on whose ownership makes better
use of the assets and increases the total surplus from the relationship-specific investments.
Therefore, the net benefit of shifting patent ownership from employees to firms depends
highly on whether the firms or employees make more efficient use the patents.
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We can easily imagine that patents are complementary assets to the extent that each
component patents must be combined to make firm-specific final products. Merges (2009)
highlights that the required integration of many components makes individual ownership
more costly for the modern complex innovation processes. There are also benefits from the
integration of patent ownership due to the synergies among the patents as explained in detail
in the following sub-section 1.4.2. The reduction in cost of separate ownership and rise in
benefits from synergistic values would be maximized under firm ownership of patents due to
firms’ comparative advantages in managing, utilizing collective resources, commercializing,
and attracting funding for innovation (Gruner , 2006). Therefore, acknowledging that the
lenders are able to properly assess the improved patent values (Chava et al., 2017), I predict
that the superior integration of patents under firm ownership by firms improves firms’ access
to debt financing by enhancing the pledgeability of the patents as collateral.
1.4.2 Asset Complementarity and Inventor Collaborations
The most important benefit of integration of patent ownership is that there is a reduction
in holdup problem, which leads firms to maximize the synergistic value of patents from more
efficient and productive use of patents. The value of patent portfolios over individual patents
emphasizes the significance of synergistic values of patents created by the economies of scope,
which arise from different business applications of a firm’s underlying expertise and direct
transfer of knowledge between the firm’s businesses (Helfat 1997, Henderson and Cockburn
1996). I measure the changes in the synergistic value of patents by asset complementarity
and inventor collaboration. The former captures the reduction in holdup problem which
invigorates the complementary use of patents, whereas the latter captures the changes in
inventor incentives to promote collaboration rather than competing against each other.
To measure asset complementarity, I use self-citation of patents. Hall et al. (2005) sug-
gest that citations, in general, convey technological and economically significant information
embodied in patents by disclosing information about linkages between inventions, inventors,
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and assignees. In particular, self-citations represent transfers of knowledge that are mostly
internalized and provide a signal regarding the value to the firm of the subsequent down-the-
line, technologically connected innovations (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg , 2001). The authors
additionally highlight that self-citations are a reflection of the knowledge accumulation and
suggestive of the firms’ incentives to internalize some of the knowledge spillovers created by
its own developments. It is also important to note that self-citations, in fact, capture cross-
citations among different inventors within the same firm. Thus, an increase in self-citation
would indicate a greater integration of a firm’s overall internal resources and technology.
Another measure of complementarity is inventor collaboration. The complex nature of
today’s innovations values inventor collaborations and explains a shift from “hero-inventor”
to team production environment (Cherensky 1993, Merges 1999). The integration changes
the incentives of the employees and encourages them to share information and co-operate
given relatively small return but also small cost of doing so (Hart , 1995). I use the number
of inventors assigned to each patent as a proxy for such collaborative efforts, since the in-
tegration is likely to promote collaboration rather than competition that stresses individual
efforts. I expect that both the asset complementarity and inventor collaboration measures
to rise subsequent to the treatment.
1.4.3 Pledgeability of Patents
The asset complementarity and inventor collaboration improve patent pledgeability by
enhancing productivity and value of patents resulting from the better integrative innovation
processes. Helfat (1997) finds that firms with larger amounts of complementary technological
knowledge and physical assets undertook larger amounts of R&D, which suggests that the
asset complementarity reinforces productivity. I first measure productivity by counting the
number of granted patents. For any concerns with raw counts capturing excessive attempts
through larger number of applications, I employ the percentage of successful patent appli-
cations as the second measure. These measures capture how fruitful was a firm’s innovative
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efforts under the improved asset integration and inventor collaboration. I expect both mea-
sures to increase after the treatment.
One of the limitations with plain patent count is that it is inherently limited in the ex-
tent to which it can capture heterogeneity in value and importance of each patent (Griliches,
Pakes, and Hall , 1987). Hence, I use citations received from other firms as a measure of the
quality and economic value of patents. Citations do not only convey quality of patents but
also suggest redeployability of patents in the secondary market (Hochberg et al., 2017) by
proxying for potential use by others, both of which are important for the assessment of the
patent values by lenders.
I first compare the citations before and after the treatment on existing patents granted
prior to the treatment. More productive use of the existing patents under firm ownership of
patents would attract greater external interests due to changes in the perception of intrinsic
values of the patents. Then, to compare across old and new patents, I compute the cita-
tions received in the first 3-years post grant13 to capture whether patents that are granted
post treatment additionally benefit from the improved integration. I hypothesize that these
citation measures increase subsequent to the increased property rights. Overall, the im-
provement in patent productivity and quality would represent the enhanced pledgeability of
patents that lead to incremental access to debt financing.
1.5 Data
Although pre-invention assignment agreements are commonly required as a part of em-
ployment contract, whether or not a firm uses the contract is only partially observable.14
However, it is widely accepted that the pre-invention assignment agreements are typically
presented to engineers and almost all technical employees. To ensure that sample firm
employees are bound by such contract, I restrict my sample to patenting US public firms
13Mehta, Rysman, and Simcoe (2009) find that patent citations peak 2-3 years after grant date.
14Sometimes firms disclose the use of pre-invention assignment agreement on annual financial statements
such as 10-K, but firms are not required to do so.
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(country of incorporation is United States) in Compustat. I also exclude financial firms (SIC
code 6000-6999) and utilites (SIC codes 4900-4999) for the reasons that these firms may be
affected by capital requirements or regulatory supervision. I drop observations with missing
total assets and replace missing values of debt with zero.
Next, I collect patent application and grant data from United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office (USPTO). USPTO provides US patent applications and grant documents from
1926 to present. I download each document between 2003-2016. Each document contains
information about the patent, application and grant dates, names and locations of inventors
and assignees, and citations. I keep only the utility patents15 assigned to US domicile cor-
porations so that I can make sure the empirical setting applies to the sample firms. Then,
I name-match the collected data to the Compustat sample firms. One advantage of the
USPTO data is that it also provides application documents that are not eventually granted.
This makes it possible to compute success rate of patent applications used in the analyses.
A detailed description of how the data was collected is in the Appendix A1.
The final sample consists of 1,959 unique patenting firms during the sample period of
2003-2013. Table 1.1 describes the sample firms. The main dependent variable is total debt-
to-assets ratio, computed by dividing the sum of short-term and long-term debt by total
assets. Panel A describes financial characteristics of all sample firms during the entire sam-
ple period from 2003-2013. Notice that the total debt-to-assets ratio is slightly smaller than
the average of all Compustat firms. This is consistent with the stylized fact that knowledge-
intensive firms tend to carry less debt. The ratio is even smaller for firms in the treatment
states presented in Panel B. Panel B compares the firm characteristics by treatment and
control state firms only during the pre-treatment period between 2003-2007. The treatment
state firms are smaller in size and have relatively lower total debt-to-assets ratio. The treat-
ment state firms also in general seem to be involved in slightly greater patent activities. The
p-values in the last column show that both the financial and patent activity characteristics
15Utility patents are inventions of a new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or a new and useful improvement thereof.
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are statistically different between the treatment state firms and control state firms.
The fact that the treated and control firms are different on observable dimensions may
raise concerns for endogeneity issues in the empirical analyses given the possibility that they
may also differ on unobservable dimensions in a way that violates parallel trends assump-
tion. These concerns are mitigated in the following ways. First, the difference-in-difference
setting fully accounts for any observable level difference between the treatment and control
groups using the treat indicator. Second, although there is no way to formally test the par-
allel trends assumption, I show in Figure 1.1 that the treatment and control groups during
the pre-treatment period seem to have parallel trends. In addition, I include firm fixed ef-
fects in all of my regression specifications to mitigate potential confounding effects of the
time-invariant unobservables. Lastly, I do a robustness check with matching on observable
regressions at the end of the results section.
1.6 Results
The results are organized as follows. I first show debt financing results from difference-
in-difference regressions. I also present a graphical illustration of the difference-in-difference
regression coefficients in Figure 1.1. After presenting the main results on debt financing, I
explore underlying mechanisms using the same difference-in-difference framework.
1.6.1 Increasing Debt Financing
Table 1.2 presents the main difference-in-difference regression results on debt financing.
In Columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is total debt-to-assets ratio. Column (1)
includes firm and year fixed effects to remove any time-invariant unobservable firm char-
acteristics and year-specific macroeconomic effects. Column (2) sharpens the specification
by including firm and industry-year fixed effects by further removing industry-year specific
shock that may cause differential leverage outcome. The DD coefficients show that an av-
erage treated firm increases the total debt-to-assets ratio by about 2.5 percentage points
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subsequent to the increasing firm property rights to employee inventions. The estimated
increase is 18% relative to an average of 0.14, which is equivalent to $62 million increase in
total debt for an average firm with $2.46 billion total assets.
To give some economic contents to this number, I compare it to some of the results from
the creditor rights and debt financing literature. Bae and Goyal (2009) find that better
enforceability of contracts in 49 countries over 1994-2003 increases the loan amounts by
$57 million. Loumioti (2013) finds that firms using patents as collateral during 1996-2005
increase secured syndicated loan amount by $51 million. Mann (2017), by exploiting an
exogenous changes in creditor rights, finds that strengthening creditor rights increases to-
tal debt by $26 million per quarter. Although each paper derives variations from different
sources, the key underlying mechanism is relaxing market frictions for borrowers using col-
lateral, and find roughly similar changes in the level of debt financing.
To ensure that the treated firms experience increase in access to debt financing and thus
issue more new debt, I use new issuance of long-term debt (dltis) scaled by total assets at
the beginning of the year as a dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4). The estimates
show that an average treated firm increases new long-term debt issuance by approximately
1.5 percentage points. This is equivalent to as large as 23% ($37 million) increase in the
ratio (dollar amount of long-term debt issuance), which accounts for about half of the total
debt increase. The results support that the increase in property rights to employee patents
enhances treated firms’ ability to raise additional debt financing.
Figure 1.1 adds graphical illustration of the difference-in-difference results. The graph
plots the DD coefficient estimates by event years. The negative numbers are years prior to
the treatment in 2008, zero in treatment year, and positive numbers are years post of the
treatment in 2008. The horizontal axis shows the event time, and the vertical axis shows
DD coefficient estimates. There are four key observations to be made in this figure. First,
the graph shows that, during the pre-treatment years, the DD estimates that capture the
level difference in the outcome variable stay flat and relatively close to zero, supporting the
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evidence that the pre-trends assumption holds. Second, the treatment effect is concentrated
on the event year. Recall that the CAFC decision was made early in Febrary of 2008, al-
lowing enough time for firms to adjust and show concentrated treatment effects in the year
of the event. There seems to be a slight increase in the latter years, which merits further
investigation of the timing of changes that takes effect in increasing the level of debt. I
explain this timing of changes in Section 1.6.4. Third, the gray plots represent statistically
insignificant estimates, whereas the yellow plots represent statistically significant estimates.
The plots show that the estimates are close to zero and statistically insignificant during the
pre-treatment years, but as soon as the treatment takes effect in event year zero, the esti-
mates increase in magnitude, as well as become statistically significant. Lastly, there is no
reversal of the effect in the post-treatment period.
I further provide a falsification test to check the internal validity and run additional
analyses to eliminate a few potential alternative stories. To ensure that the court ruling is
only relevant for the patenting firms’ debt financing through its impact on invention assign-
ment agreements, I run the baseline regressions in Table 1.2 for non-patenting firms. The
results are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix A. The DD coefficient on total debt-to-
assets ratio is not only statistically insignificant, but the magnitude is substantially smaller
for non-patenting firms that have higher average pre-treatment total debt-to-assets ratio of
0.28. Furthermore, the DD coefficients on long-term debt issuance are slightly negative and
statistically indistinguishable from zero. The internal validity of the empirical setting and
the results further reinforce that the observed changes in the level of debt financing is likely
due to the treatment effect of increasing property rights to firms after CAFC ruling.
Next, if firms have geographic subsidiaries located in multiple states and thus are exposed
to multiple state laws governing the invention assignment agreements, the effect of the treat-
ment may be less clear and raise concerns that the results found in Table 1.2 capture some
spurious effects. First, I verify from the data that approximately 90% of patents are issued
to the state of headquarters. Second, I only use firms operating in single state and run the
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same regressions from Table 1.2. The results are presented in the Appendix Table A2. Each
column presents results for zero, fewer than or equal to one, or fewer than or equal to two
geographic subsidiaries, respectively.16 The results still hold, but the statistical significance
weakens, possibly attributable to significantly reduced number of observations.
I avoid including time-varying control variables that may be affected by the treatment
and give inconsistent estimates of the treatment effect. However, In Table A3 in the Ap-
pendix A shows that I find similar results when include common controls in the leverage
literature in Columns (1)-(6) and also when include a measure of stock of innovation and
R&D expenditures in Columns (7) and (8), respectively. In unreported table, I also confirm
that the new long-term debt issuance results also stay robust to inclusion of these controls.
1.6.2 Types of Debt and Firms
In previous section, I show that the increase in firm ownership of employee patents in-
crease firms’ debt financing. Access to which types of debt increase? Table 1.3 presents
the results on different types of debt. Kerr and Nanda (2015) emphasizes in their survey
of financing for innovation wide use of bank debt by innovative firms from small startups
to public firms. Therefore, I look into the changes in amount of bank debt, particularly as
bank debt is highly likely backed by collateral. Consistently, Column (1) shows that the
bank debt of treated firms increases relative to that of control firms by about 19%.
I further investigate whether increasing property rights also affect maturity of increasing
debt financing by substituting for borrower risk. Within the incomplete framework, lenders
can better control borrower risk if they know they will be able to seize collateralized assets,
or credibly threaten to take these assets, ex post, in default. The transfer of control rights
upon default allow greater bargaining power for lenders, who in turn extend credit on more
favorable terms, such as lower interest rates or longer maturities.17 Therefore, an increased
16The data is provided on Professor Scott Dyreng through https://sites.google.com/site/scottdyreng/Home/data-
and-code
17Qian and Strahan (2007) also finds in a cross-country setting that under stronger creditor protection,
loans have longer maturities, highlighting debt maturity is an effective contracting tool in environments with
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capacity to pledge assets makes collateral more effective and increase creditor protection and
enhancing loan availability. Whereas the long-term debt increases significantly in Column
(3), short-term debt in Columns (4)-(6) are statistically indistinguishable from zero. In sum,
increasing property rights allow firms to use more secured debt financing and also benefit
from the access to long-term debt by securing creditor protection through pledged collateral.
As pointed out in Section 1.5, the overall sample firms tend to be small and hold low debt
compared to an average Compustat firm. The summary statistic in Table 1.1 Panel A indeed
shows that about 25% of sample firms have zero total debt-to-assets ratio. The estimates
presented in the baseline regression shows the average effect of increase in firm ownership of
employee inventions subsequent to the court ruling. Given the skewed distribution of total
debt-to-assets ratio, looking into which firms are more conducive to raising more debt in a re-
sponse to changes in property rights helps with understanding the effects better. Therefore,
I present a quantile regression framework in Table 1.4 Panel A and examine heterogeneous
impact of increasing property rights on firms with different starting levels of debt.
The first column reports a baseline estimate with industry and year fixed effects to be
consistent with the rest of quantile regression specifications. The quantile estimates are re-
ported staring with the 30th percentile because many observations in the lower quantiles are
zero in both the treated and control distributions. The median estimate is closest to the
baseline estimate. I find larger beneficiaries of shifting property rights arise among firms that
had some level of debt to start with. The results are suggestive of some degree of economies
of scope and scale required in the underlying channel. This is because synergies in the un-
derlying innovation process is more likely for firms with some useful existing resources.
The quantile regression results raise question on whether increasing property rights help
relax financial constraints of a subset of treated firms. In Table 1.4 Panel B, I use size
and age as rough proxies of financial constraints interaction terms. Interestingly, the results
in Columns (1) and (2) show that the triple interaction term is statistically insignificant,
weak legal protection and costly contract enforcement (Diamond , 2004).
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suggesting there is no evident benefits of higher property rights based on the financial con-
straints. However, Column (3) shows that the effect of firm ownership of patent is statisti-
cally significantly higher for firms with multiple business segment. This is consistent with
the quantile regression results, where there is greater chance for synergistic underlying inno-
vation process where firms can leverage from different business segments.
Overall, these results suggest that the increasing debt financing seems to be attributable
to changes in innovation processes that makes patents become more pledgeable. I further
investigate underlying channels in the next section.
1.6.3 Asset Complementarity and Inventor Collaboration
In Table 1.5, I present two sets of results on improved integrative innovation processes.
In Columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is log number of self-citation. It is computed
as the sum of all self-citations made to the firm’s existing patents granted within the last ten
years by a cohort of patent applications submitted in the same year. Hall et al. (2005) find
that the median backward citation lag is 10 years, so I limit the age of pool of cited patents
to ten years so that the relationship is not merely picking up the size of existing pool of
patents, particularly for older firms. Furthermore, I control for the number of applications
submitted in Column (2) to avoid the possibility that the increase in citations is driven
mechanically by more applications submitted.
In the context of this paper, self-citation captures the internal transfers of knowledge
and complementary use of firms’ existing patents in current innovation activities. In the
post-treatment period, an average treated firm’s self-citation rises by 15%. To give some
economic meaning to this number, note that the average total number of self-citations made
per year during the pre-treatment period is 38. Post-treatment, an average treated firm
makes 6 additional self-citations to the firm’s existing patents from its own patent pool.
This means that the treated firms make greater use of its own assets and benefit from the
cumulative stock of patents.
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The complementarity exists not only in assets but also among the inventors of the patents.
In Columns (3) and (4), I measure the inventor collaboration as average number of inven-
tors assigned per patent. This is to capture the possibility that firms also promote research
environment in which more inventors collaborate in a team (Merges 1999, Cherensky 1993).
The inventor collaboration increases by 5%. Overall, consistent with patent portfolio the-
ory and the hypothesis in Section 1.4.2, the shift in ownership of employee inventions to
firms seems to enhance how firms use existing portfolio of assets together. Next, to further
identify how the improvements in asset complementarity and inventor collaboration affect
the pledgeability of patents, I examine productivity and changes in the economic value of
patents.
1.6.4 Productivity and Pledgeability
Figure 1.2 compares the increase in use of patent as collateral between the treated and
control firms, measuring the average number of patent reassignment transactions identified
as “security interest” per firm by pre-treatment and post-treatment period. The average
number of patents pledged as collateral stays about the same for control firms but increases
for treated firms. The increase in the use of patents as collateral can be driven by changes
not only in quantity but also in quality of patents under firm ownership of patents. So I
turn to examining different measures of changes in patents pledgeability.
I use two measures of productivity. In Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1.6, the dependent
variable is log number of granted patents, which measures the productivity level. In Columns
(3) and (4), the dependent variable is number of granted patents scaled by R&D expenses.18
In the first two columns, I find that an average treated firm is granted 15% more patents
compared to a control firm after gaining more property rights to employee patents. This is
equivalent to about 3 more patents granted for a treated firm. Given the mean (median)
number of granted patents for treated firms during the pre-treatment period is 18 (2), this is
18The productivity result using 2 years lagged patent grant measure, accounting for the time it takes for
innovation effort to materialize, remains statistically strong and similar in magnitude.
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a sizable increase in patent productivity. In Columns (3) and (4), I find that the innovation
efficiency measured by the number of granted patents per dollar spent on R&D increases by
0.14. This means that for every $100 spent, an average treated firm is granted 14 additional
patents, after the increase in property rights.
Lastly, in Table 1.7, I show the increase in the quality of patents in terms of citation
measures to capture the changes in the economic value of patents. The intuition is that the
internal knowledge transfers induced by an enhanced integration triggers greater external
innovative interests in the use of patents, and the citation counts embody economic values of
these linkages among patent uses. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) is average
total number of citations received per existing patents that had been granted prior to the
treatment year. This is to isolate the changes in citations for the same patents before and
after the treatment. To do so, I create the measure using only the patents that had been
granted prior to the treatment year. The estimated additional increase is 51% per patent and
translates to 12 additional citations received by the existing patents of an average treated
firm. Given the number of citations received tends to diminish with time, finding the strong
increase in the citations to existing patents suggests a significant changes in firms’ incentives
to make greater use of its asset pool.
In Columns (3) and (4), I use the average number of total citations received per patent
in the first 3-years post grant. This measure is to compare the existing patents with newly
granted patents on the same ground since older patents have more time to accrue citations.
I use three years as the comparison window because patent citations peak 2-3 years after
grant date (Mehta et al., 2009), and thus capture the most of meaningful citations during
the first three years. Since this takes care of the concerns with older patents mechanically
accruing more citations, I do not include patent age in the first two columns. The number
of citations received by newly granted patents to an average treated firm grows by 8%
per patent in the post-treatment period. This is equivalent to 6 additional citations for
newly granted patents. The interpretation requires some attention because the first 3-years
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citations measure for patents that are granted 2-3 years prior to the court ruling would
overlap with post-treatment period. However, finding a strong positive effect, despite the
fact that the overlapping period should work against finding a strong increase, implies a
sharp changes around the treatment.
This section provides additional channel evidence on improved productivity and success
of innovation efforts that reinforce the the collateral value of the patents for debt financing.
1.6.5 Progression of changes
In this section, I further layout some detailed tests on the timing of material impacts
found in the previous sections. By the nature of R&D process, it may take some time for the
treated firms to integrate assets to its full capacity. Therefore, I further distinguish changes
that are immediately reflected in debt financing from changes that gradually incorporated
with some time lag. In Figure 1.1, I show that the majority of treatment effect is concen-
trated around the event year in 2008, and there is some additional increase in latter years.
This prompts a question on the time progression of the channel effects found in the previ-
ous sections. To examine the changes in detail, I run the same difference-in-difference by
replacing post with year before, event year, and post-event years. The results are intuitive.
In Table 1.8, Column (1) shows an immediate effect of complementary asset uses measured
by total number of self-citations as a percentage of all citations made by new applications
submitted in a year. The point estimate is insignificant in the year prior to the treatment,
but the estimates become statistically significant and large starting in the event year. The
immediate improvement in complementarity is intuitive because firms make use of assets
that are already in place.
On the other hand, I would expect a mechanical lag in patent grants and inventor collab-
oration, given the patent grant process takes about 2-3 years (Hall et al., 2001), and firms
need some time to reorganize the inventor groups. Consistent with this prediction, Columns
(2) and (3) show changes that happen with some time lags. Although the effect is somewhat
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positive prior to the treatment, in Column (2), there is a slightly negative effect around
the treatment year, then the estimates become stronger and positive starting in the second
year and onwards. The temporary decline around the event year may suggest that, with the
shift of property rights to firms, the employee inventor incentives may be adversely affected
for some time, but recover with some time lag. Column (3) also shows some time lag in
patent productivity measured by the number of granted patents. These lagged effects may,
in turn, explain why some of the main debt financing effect has additional increase in the
latter years in the post-treatment period. That is, the treated firms gradually incorporate
the changes in the asset holdings and enhance efficient integration of the assets that result
in the improvement in pledgeability of patents as collateral.
1.7 Discussion
Incomplete contract is an important friction considered in this paper. In practice, con-
tractual provisions on decisions over innovation processes are highly complex. As emphasized
in Aghion and Tirol (1994), “the exact nature of the innovation is ill-defined ex ante, and two
parties cannot contract for delivery of a specific innovation.” This is because contracting
on all contingencies, such as changing product market conditions, competition dynamics,
demands, or technology shocks, is impossible. Moreover, firms and employees cannot com-
municate and negotiate about all possibilities or write a clear contract that courts can then
enforce. Therefore, fully specifying the usage of patents in every state of the world in a
contract ex ante is too costly for firms.
Instead, specifying property rights which allow an asset owner to decide the usage of
patents increases her ex ante incentives to make relationship-specific investments. The in-
vestment here represents an asset owner’s non-physical investment decisions about how to
make the asset more productive.19 The CAFC court ruling in the empirical setting changes
the ownership of patents but not the uncertainties inherent in the innovation processes. The
19The R&D spending is actually unaffected in data.
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patent ownership, in turn, improves the firm’s innovation productivity, more than market
transactions due to greater marginal returns from relationship-specific innovation processes.
More productive innovation processes help improve pledgeability of patents in two ways.
For a patent to have useful value as collateral when a borrower defaults, redeployability and
quality of the patent are the two most important factors for lenders. The firm ownership of
patents enhances both redeployability and quality of patents because firms have comparative
advantages in making greater resources (financially and organizationally), attracting wider
interests in technology, and thus increasing demand for the technology. Therefore, the firm
ownership of patents increases the availability of pledgeable patents for greater access to
secured debt financing, as shown in the main regression results.
Shifting property rights creates tension between incentives of firms and employees in
opposite directions, although the overall effect appears to be net positive. I further investi-
gate the changes in inventor-employee incentives after the court ruling and find statistically
indistinguishable changes in inventor-level productivity (untabulated), possibly for two rea-
sons. First, the inventor productivity is measured by the number of granted patents per
inventor, which only captures observable efforts. Second, when patents are complementary,
an employee’s patent alone is useless without other patents, so giving up her patent does
not change the employee’s marginal return absent a relationship-specific investment with the
firm. The second possibility helps explain why this paper finds contrasting results from Hvide
and Jones (2016), which finds negative innovation incentives when researchers affiliated with
universities lose their property rights. In the university setting, both the relationship-specific
innovation and asset complementarity are absent. Also, university compensation schemes
with regards to innovation are highly likely be different from that of corporations.
I further look into state-level aggregate innovation effects of the court ruling. The re-
sults are reported in Appendix Table A5. I use the universe of patents on USPTO patent
grant records, which allows me to compare changes in innovation level by different groups
of inventors. Column (1) shows that the general effect of the court ruling on corporations,
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which in this analysis is comprised of the sample firms and private companies, is consistent
with the main results. This highlights that the tension in property rights between firms and
employees exists in a broader sample. However, the positive innovation incentive is absent
for the government (Column (2)) and individuals (Column (3)). The government-assigned
patent result is not surprising given that contract and agreement terms are heavily regulated
by different property rights allocation standards. Also, since patents assigned to individuals
do not suffer from ownership allocation issues, it is reasonable not to find any effects on
them.
Is there a possibility for firms to rewrite contracts with their employees after the court
ruling to circumvent the changes in property rights? It is not likely given higher contract-
ing and enforcement costs under the old patent ownership structure. The overall effect of
shifting property rights from employee patents to firms seems to have enhanced underlying
innovation efficiency. However, the overall firm value effect is less clear,20 particularly when
inventor-level incentives seem to have remained unchanged. One possibility is that firms may
have increased employee compensation for shifted patent ownership, which would increase
outflows of cash and offset the efficiency gains. This calls for further investigation of property
rights and compensation of inventor-employees, which is outside the scope of this paper.21
1.8 Robustness
1.8.1 Matching Regressions
To ease concerns for the time-varying differences in observable firm characteristics, I re-
run the main regressions using matched samples on observable firm characteristics. Table
1.9 reports the propensity score matching diagnostics. As with any endogeneity problems,
a matching regression itself does not fully resolve identification concerns, but, used in con-
20In unreported result of event study on a comparison of return changes between the treated and control
group around the court’s ruling, I do not find differences of returns.
21This would require employee-level wages data, specifically for those who are identified as corporate
inventors.
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junction with the difference-in-difference setting, can provide a useful robustness test for ear-
lier regression results. There are observable and statistically significant differences between
the treatment and control group during the pre-treatment period shown in the pre-match
columns. It is important to note that the difference in average leverage growth rates between
the treatment and control group is statistically insignificant, reinforcing the parallel trends
assumptions. The next three columns compare the same variables after the matching on
propensity scores. The p-values reported on the pairwise mean differences between treat-
ment and control groups become all statistically insignificant, assuring that the matching
process has removed meaningful differences on observable dimensions. In sum, the main
results of this paper remain robust to matching away the observable differences.
Table 1.10 presents the matching regression results using the matched sample. I use
propensity score matching using the observable differences between the treated and control
firms reported in Table 1.1. In addition, to ensure that the matching process embodies par-
allel trend assumption of the difference-in-difference framework, I include the annual growth
rate of the total debt-to-assets ratio in the propensity score (Lemmon and Roberts , 2010).
The matching regression coefficients decrease slightly but remain robust to both nearest
neighbor matching with n = 1 and n = 2 with replacement.
1.8.2 Alternative Explanations
In this section, I evaluate potential alternative explanations stemming from the fact that
firms can choose the state of their corporate headquarters, which is used to assign treatment
indicator in the empirical setting. Then, I address a possibility of concurrent effects of
financial crisis around the CAFC decision in 2008.
1.8.2.1 Non-random Selection of Headquarter State
Since firms choose in which state to locate their headquarters, I cannot completely rule
out the possibility that the results may be affected by unobserved factors that are corre-
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lated with both the headquarter state decision and financing decision. However, for the
non-random treatment to be consistent with the results, it would need an omitted variable
that not only relates to firm’s headquarter choice but also explains why the level of debt
financing for the firms in the eight treatment states responds differently from that of firms
in the control states, specifically around 2008.
The major determinants of a firm’s state of headquarter choice are natural resources,
unionization levels, input-output relationships, state taxes, founder’s home location, energy
costs, and environmental regulation (Garmaise, 2011). One likely confounding factor is the
state corporate tax rates. That is, firms choose to locate in one of the eight treated states
for corporate tax reasons, particularly with regards to debt tax shields. If this is so, then the
differential debt financing responses between treated firms and control firms may be found,
even in the absence of the property rights shock. In Table A4, I verify that the pre-treatment
trends assumption holds for the state corporate tax rates, and that the year-by-year changes
in corporate tax rate during the entire sample period are not statistically different between
the treatment and control states.22 The regression results reported in Columns (3) of Table
A3 are robust to controlling for the state-level corporate tax rates and, thus, rule out the
state tax story.
Second, following the enactment of employee protection state legislations in the early
1990s, innovative firms that are more protective of their legal rights over patents may have
selected out of the eight treatment states, leaving only the firms with relatively higher frac-
tion of tangible assets, such as plants and equipment, that are easily pledged as collateral.
This may cause the differential access to debt financing over time. To eliminate the possi-
bility that a difference in pre-treatment level of tangible assets drives the result, I augment
the baseline specification by including pre-treatment level of tangible assets, measured by
pre-treatment average level of plants and equipment scaled by total assets, interacted by the
post indicator. In Columns (4) of Table A3, I verify that the results remain robust.
22The corporate tax rates are collected from Tax Foundation. The data is available at
https://taxfoundation.org/state-corporate-income-tax-rates/
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Lastly, I check to see if firms with relatively high future innovation investment oppor-
tunities selected into the eight treatment states to take advantage of the employee rights
protection, and thus increase their debt financing to materialize the opportunity. In Figure
A1 Panel (b) in the Appendix A, I show that the distribution of intellectual property-intensive
firms (or employments) are not all concentrated in the eight treated states. Therefore, if
the main results were driven by ex-ante investment opportunity differences, I should find
the similar results in firms in untreated states as well. This is not so. In untabulated re-
gression without year fixed effects, I find that the coefficient on post is very close to zero
and statistically insignificant, showing that the level of debt financing for firms in control
states remained about the same over time. In addition, I include the pre-treatment level of
innovation to control for the ex ante innovation opportunities and again find the results are
robust.
1.8.2.2 Financial Crisis
I address potential concerns with the overlapping period of the CAFC ruling with the
financial crisis in 2008. The concern here is that the main results may be driven by some
unobservable state-specific factor that causes treatment states to react differently to the
financial crisis. Ideally, I would repeat my analysis by including state-year fixed effects to
control for state-year specific shock that would account for differential effect of the financial
crisis. However, the treatment variable is state-level, and the state-year fixed effects would
absorb the treat×post effect. I handle this problem in two ways. First, in Appendix Table
A4, I report the differences in means of important state-level economic variable growth rates
between treated and untreated states. I show that the GDP growth, GDP per capita growth,
and unemployment rate growth are all statistically indifferent from zero for all years during
the sample period, ensuring that the trends in state economic conditions of the treatment
and control states are similar both before and after 2008.
Second, I mitigate this concern by additionally including state with industry-year fixed
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effects or state-industry with year fixed effects. The former specification captures variation
among same-state firms, whereas the latter is more stringent model that captures varia-
tion only among the same industry firms in the same states. Tables 1.11-1.14 reports the
additional results. The main regression results in Table 1.11 are remain similar, both eco-
nomically and statistically significantly, for the total debt-to-assets ratio and strengthens for
the long-term debt issuance after including the state fixed effects. In Table 1.12, the self-
citation results are robust, whereas the magnitude and statistical significance of inventor
collaboration results weaken slightly to about 3% increase. The number of granted patents
in Table 1.13 and citations to existing patents in Table 1.14 strengthens, whereas the results
on percentage of successful applications and citations to new patents weakens and become
statistically insignificant.
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I consider how property rights allocation alleviates some inefficiencies
in firms’ economic relationship with inventor-employees in innovation processes and affect
knowledge-intensive firms’ debt financing. This is an important issue not only because
property rights increase pledgeability of patents but more importantly because the asset
ownership improves firms’ incentives to maximize synergistic values of patents, which are
valuable to firms’ lenders.
I empirically investigate the effects of firms’ increasing property rights to employee patents
on debt financing capacity. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, I exploit the Court of Appeals
Federal Circuit ruling on invention assignment agreements that exogenously increased firms’
property rights to inventor-employee patents. I find that the pro-employer interpretation of
the invention assignment agreement increases total debt by an average $62 million. I also
provide evidence that the increased access to debt financing is attributable to firms’ improved
integration of existing patents, inventor collaboration, and innovation productivity.
Overall, this paper highlights an optimal patent ownership structure under incomplete
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contracting from the firms’ perspective. Recognizing that corporate inventor-employees are
accountable for about 90% of all patentable inventions in the US (Pisegna-Cook 1994, Gruner
2006), whether the firm ownership of employee patents is optimal for the social level of in-
novation in the economy is an interesting question but beyond the scope of this paper. A
detailed data on inventor-employee employment, moves, and wages would provide the oppor-
tunity to expand the current research to implications of property rights on entrepreneurial
spawning and firms’ investment in human capital to address comprehensive impact of prop-
erty rights allocation.
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Figure 1.1: Difference in Leverage Ratio by Years to Treatment
This figure presents the regression coefficients in event time. The horizontal axis indicates event time, where
negative numbers are pre-treatment years, zero is the year in which CAFC ruling was made, and positive
numbers are post-treatment years. The vertical axis shows the coefficient estimates, βk in the regression
specification below. The gray dots show statistically insignificant coefficients, whereas the yellow dots show
statistically significant at 1%-level coefficients. The dotted lines are confidence intervals at 10%-level. All
standard errors are clustered by state.
Total debt/Assetsit = α+
∑
k
βktreati × eventk + δi + γt + it
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Figure 1.2: Number of Patents Pledged as Collateral
This figure compares the changes in the average number of patents pledged as collateral between treated
and control group. The data comes from USPTO Patent Assignment files. The vertical axis measures
the average number number of patent pledged as collateral per firm. The patents pledged as collateral is
identified using assignment transactions marked as “security interest.”
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for firms in my sample, which comprises of actively patenting firms
during the sample period of 2003-2013. I also exclude firms in financials and regulated industries. Panel A
provides descriptive characteristics of all sample firms between 2003-2013. Panel B summarizes key variables
used in the empirical analyses by treatment and control group firms during the pre-treatment period between
2003-2007. The last column shows p-value of difference in means. The outcome variable in the main regression
is Total debt/Assets, which is winsorized between zero and one. For variable definitions and details of their
construction, see Appendix A3. Observations with missing asset are dropped.
Panel A: All Sample Firms Summary (2003-2013)
Mean Std. dev. p25 p50 p75 N
Assets ($ mil) 5,046 26,667 70 333 1,850 16,540
Ln(Assets) 5.92 2.32 4.25 5.81 7.52 16,540
Total debt/Assets 0.18 0.22 0.00 0.11 0.28 16,540
R&D exp/Assets 0.12 0.19 0.01 0.06 0.15 16,540
Ppent/Assets 0.17 0.16 0.06 0.12 0.24 16,540
Panel B: Pre-treatment Comparisons (2003-2007)
Treatment State* Control State
Variables Mean N Mean N p-value
Assets ($ mil) 2,460 3,630 5,062 5,123 0.000
Ln(Assets) 5.48 3,630 5.88 5,123 0.000
Total Debt/Assets 0.14 3,630 0.20 5,123 0.000
LTD issuance 0.07 3,630 0.10 5,123 0.000
R&D exp/Assets 0.15 3,630 0.10 5,123 0.000
Ppent/Assets 0.14 3,630 0.20 5,123 0.000
Granted patents 18.26 3,630 16.74 5,123 0.551
Patent applications 33.60 3,630 28.34 5,123 0.357
% successful application 74.20 2,644 72.52 3,435 0.039
Avg. First 3-yrs citations 2.43 2,413 1.98 2,988 0.000
Avg. citations 0.84 3,630 0.71 5,123 0.000
Number of inventors 2.78 3,017 2.70 3,960 0.027
Number of self-citation 38.40 3,475 43.52 4,818 0.558
*Treatment states include CA, DE, IL, KS, MN, NC, UT, and WA.
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Table 1.2: Increasing Debt Financing
This table reports the results of estimating the main difference-in-difference regressions below to examine
how shifting property rights to patents from employees to firms affects firms’ debt financing. The dependent
variable in Columns (1) and (2) is Total debt/Assets. The dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is LTD
issuance. The odd-numbered columns include firm and year fixed effects, and the even-numbered columns
use more stringent specification including firm and industry-year fixed effects. For variable definitions and
details of their construction, see Appendix A3. All standard errors are clustered by state.
yit = α+ β1treati × postt + δi + γt + it
yit = α+ β1treati × postt + β2 postt + δi + θjt + it
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total debt/Assets Total debt/Assets LTD issuance LTD issuance
treat×post 0.026∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.013∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007)
post -0.018 0.011
(0.012) (0.019)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y – Y –
Industry-year FE N Y N Y
Observations 16,540 16,184 16,540 16,184
Adjusted R2 0.610 0.605 0.279 0.276
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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Table 1.3: Types of Debt
The table reports the results of estimating the difference-in-difference regressions below to examine how shifting property rights to patents from
employees to firms affects different types of debt. The data on different types of debt is collected from Capital IQ. Bank Debt/AT, Conv. Debt/AT,
LTD/AT, and Short-term Debt are bank debt, convertible debt, long-term debt (dltt), and short-term debt (dlc) scaled by total assets, respectively.
Mature in 1 yr (dd1) and Mature in 1 or 2 yrs (dd2) are current portion long-term debt due in one or two years. For variable definitions and details
of their construction, see Appendix A3. All standard errors are clustered by state.
Types of Debtit = α+ β1treati × postt + δi + γt + it
Short-term debt
Bank Debt Conv. Debt Long-term Debt Short-term Debt Mature in 1 yr Mature in 1 or 2 yrs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treatXpost 0.007∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 13,991 13,991 13,991 16,540 16,540 16,540
Adjusted R2 0.501 0.511 0.610 0.300 0.169 0.195
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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Table 1.4: Which Firms Benefit the Most?
Panel A presents quantile regression analysis where the dependent variable is Total debt-to-assets ratio. The estimates are obtained without firm
fixed effects (which cannot be combined with quantile regressions) but instead with firm and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are obtained by
bootstrapping using 100 repetitions each time. For comparison, the first column reports an baseline estimate from a specification including firm and
industry fixed effects only. Panel B reports the cross-sectional results on the main difference-in-difference regression by including additional interaction
terms. d3 proxies financial constraints using firm size, age, and unprofitability in Columns (1) - (3), respectively. Each financial constraint indicator
is equal to 1 if the proxy is below the median among treated firms during pre-treatment period for size and age, or if the proxy is below zero for
unprofitable firms. The last interaction term, multi-segment, counts the number of business segments and is equal to 1 if the number of business
segment is greater than zero. For simplicity, only the interaction terms of interest are reported in the table. All specifications include firm and year
fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered by state.
Q(Total debt/Assetsit | τ) = α(τ) + β(τ) treati × postt + δi(τ) + γt(τ) + it(τ)
Panel A: Quantile Regressions
Baseline q30 q40 q50 q60 q70 q80 q90
treatXpost 0.026*** 0.002 0.006 0.026∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗
(0.007) (0.002) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 16,540 16,540 16,540 16,540 16,540 16,540 16,540 16,540
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
Total debt/Assetsit = α + β1 treati × postt × d3 + β2 treati × postt + β3 postt × d3 + δi + γt + it
Panel B: Financial Constraints and Organization Structure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
treatXpostX d3 -0.010 0.021 0.080 0.032
∗∗
(0.021) (0.014) (0.124) (0.012)
treatXpost 0.029∗∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
d3 Small Firms Young Firms Unprofitable Multi-segments
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 16,540 16,540 16,540 16,540
Adjusted R2 0.610 0.610 0.610 0.610
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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Table 1.5: Asset Complementarity and Inventor Collaboration
The table reports the results of estimating the difference-in-difference regressions below to examine the
asset complementarity and inventor collaboration as underlying channel of the main debt financing results.
Columns (1) and (2) examine changes in the asset complementarity measured with self-citation. In Column
(2), I include pre-treatment average count of submitted applications (absorbed by firm fixed effects) and its
interaction term the post dummy to control for any mechanical relationship between number of applications
submitted and self-citations driving the difference in response of asset complementarity. Columns (3) and (4)
examine inventor collaboration. Column (3) includes firm and year fixed effects, and Columns (1), (2), and
(4) use more stringent specification including firm and industry-year fixed effects. For variable definitions
and details of their construction, see Appendix A3. All standard errors are clustered by state.
yit = α+ β1 treati × postt + β2 postt + δi + θt + it
yit = α+ β1 treati × postt + β2 postt + β3 Controli × postt + δi + θjt + it
Log(1+self citation) Avg. inventors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
treat×post 0.144∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.071) (0.038) (0.035)
post -0.416 -0.393 -0.517
(0.351) (0.345) (0.709)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE – – Y –
Industry-year FE Y Y N Y
Control – Avg.app count – –
Observations 14,956 14,956 13,095 12,882
Adjusted R2 0.806 0.807 0.338 0.344
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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Table 1.6: Increase in Patent Productivity
The table reports the results of estimating the difference-in-difference regressions below to examine the patent
productivity as underlying patent productivity channel that supports the main debt financing results. In
Columns (1) and (2), I measure the productivity using log of number of granted patents. The results still
hold when using lagged granted patents measure. In Columns (3) and (4), I measure innovation efficiency by
scaling the number of patent grants by dollar spent on R&D. Column (3) uses only expensed R&D spending
(XRD), and Column (4) uses both expensed and capitalized R&D expenses (XRD+RDIP). The number of
observations in Columns (3) and (4) declines because due to data limitation from lagging the measure, I use
only 3 periods before and after the treatment. For all specifications, I include the firm age dummy (absorbed
by firm fixed effects) and its interaction with the post dummy to control for differential trends by firm age
and experience in patenting driving the differential outcomes. Columns (1), (3), and (4) include firm and
year fixed effects, and Column (2) uses more stringent specification including firm and industry-year fixed
effects. The efficiency results using more stringent specification are unreported but remains robust. For
variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix A3. All standard errors are clustered by
state.
yit = α+ β1 treati × postt + β2 Controli × postt + δi + γt + it
yit = α+ β1 treati × postt + β2postt + β3 Controli × postt + δi + θjt + it
Log(1+grant) Grant/R&D Exp
(1) (2) (3) (4)
treatXpost 0.145∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.140∗ 0.137∗
(0.052) (0.045) (0.083) (0.080)
post -0.540∗∗∗
(0.040)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y – Y Y
Industry-year FE N Y – –
Application year FE Y Y – –
Control Firm age Firm age – –
Observations 10,330 10,169 8,687 8,692
Adjusted R2 0.861 0.865 0.061 0.061
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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Table 1.7: Citations on New and Old Patents
The table reports the results of estimating the difference-in-difference regressions below to examine the
improvement in economic value of new and existing patents.In Columns (1) and (2), I measure the average
citations received per existing patent to compare citations received on the same portfolio of patents over time.
In Columns (3) and (4), I measure the average citations received per patent in the first 3-years after the
grant year to compare across patents of different age. In the odd-numbered columns, I allow for differential
trends by average age of pre-treatment patent portfolio. In the even-numbered columns, I further allow for
differential trends by average age of pre-treatment patent portfolio and size of patent portfolio. For each
patent portfolio age and patent stock size controls, I include the variables alone (absorbed by firm fixed
effects) and their interaction term with the post dummy. For variable definitions and further details of their
construction, see Appendix A3. All specification include firm and industry-year fixed effects. All standard
errors are clustered by state.
Citationsit = α+ β1 treati × postt + β2 Controli × postt + δi + θjt + it
Avg. citations Avg. first 3-yr citations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
treat×post 0.434∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗ 0.204∗∗
(0.143) (0.143) (0.087) (0.088)
post 2.038∗∗∗ 2.038∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗ 0.629∗∗
(0.372) (0.371) (0.309) (0.309)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Industry-year FE Y Y Y Y
Application year FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Portfolio Age Portfolio Age Portfolio Age Portfolio Age
Patent Stock Patent Stock
Observations 10,695 10,695 10,695 10,695
Adjusted R2 0.490 0.490 0.404 0.404
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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Table 1.8: Immediate and Lagged Changes
The table reports progression of changes over time in asset complementarity and productivity presented in
Tables 1.5 and 1.6. t + 0 is the year in which CAFC decision is made in 2008. The dependent variable in
Column (1) is the a total number of self citations as a percentage of all citations made by new applications
each year. Columns (2) and (3) show lagged effects. The dependent variable in Column (2) is the average
number of inventors assigned per patent. The dependent variable in Column (3) is the log of number of
granted patents. For variable definitions and further details of their construction, see Appendix A3. All
standard errors are clustered by state.
yit = α+
∑
k
βk treati × eventk + δi + it
Immediate Lagged
(1) (2) (3)
% self citation Avg. inventors Log(1+grant)
treat × t-1 0.295 0.121∗∗ 0.015
(0.181) (0.046) (0.028)
treat × t+0 0.789∗∗∗ -0.030 0.007
(0.269) (0.028) (0.042)
treat × t+1 0.492∗ 0.000 0.067
(0.264) (0.076) (0.062)
treat × t+2 0.529∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.031) (0.067)
treat× t+3+ 1.844∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗
(0.605) (0.025) (0.078)
Firm FE Y Y Y
Application year FE – – Y
Control – – Firm age
Observations 10,234 13,095 10,330
Adjusted R2 0.364 0.336 0.859
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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Table 1.9: Propensity Score Matching Diagnostics
This table presents pairwise comparisons of the variables on which the nearest neighbor matching (n=2)
with replacement is performed. The summarized variable are mean values in the pre-treatment periods.
Leverage growth is included to ensure the pre-treatment trend in the main outcome variable, total debt-to-
assets ratio, is matched. Each of the last columns in Pre-Match and Post-Match are p-value of difference in
means between Control and Treatment. The table shows that the post-matched variables are statistically
indifferent from zero. For variable definitions and further details of their construction, see Appendix A3.
Pre-Match Post-Match
Variable Control Treatment p-value Control Treatment p-value
Leverage growth 10.988 5.378 0.478 1.874 5.403 0.182
LTD issuance growth 22.728 41.658 0.563 33.956 41.848 0.839
Size growth 0.323 0.490 0.188 0.433 0.362 0.369
Assets 4,808 2,527 0.066 2,733 2,533 0.707
R&D exp. 0.119 0.162 0.000 0.169 0.161 0.458
Ppent 0.181 0.133 0.000 0.137 0.133 0.581
Log(1+ grant) 1.247 1.522 0.000 1.514 1.514 0.996
Log(1+ application) 1.588 1.920 0.000 1.945 1.913 0.694
% successful application 0.696 0.709 0.383 0.701 0.708 0.608
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Table 1.10: Increasing Debt Financing - Propensity Score Matching Regressions
The table reports the results of the difference-in-difference estimation using the propensity score matched
sample to ensure the results reported in Table 1.2 are not driven by observable differences between the
treated and control firms. The dependent variable is Total debt/Assets. The odd-numbered columns include
firm and year fixed effects, and the even-numbered columns use more stringent specification including firm
and industry-year fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered by state. Columns (1) and (2) uses nearest
neighbor matching with n=1, and Columns (3) and (4) uses nearest neighbor matching with n=2 with
replacement. All standard errors are clustered by state.
NN=1 NN=2
Total debt/Assets LTD issuance Total debt/Assets LTD issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
treat×post 0.024∗∗ 0.015∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 9,340 9,340 10,798 10,798
Adjusted R2 0.582 0.232 0.588 0.236
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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Table 1.11: Increasing Debt Financing - State Robustness
The table reports the results of estimating the main difference-in-difference regressions with state or
state-industry fixed effects. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) is Total debt/Assets. The
dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is LTD issuance. The odd-numbered columns include state and
industry-year fixed effects, and the even-numbered columns use more stringent specification additionally
including year and state-industry fixed effects. For variable definitions and further details of their
construction, see Appendix A3. All standard errors are clustered by state.
yit = α+ β1treati × postt + δs + θjt + it
yit = α+ β1treati × postt + β2postt + γt + λsj + it
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total debt/Assets Total debt/Assets LTD issuance LTD issuance
treat×post 0.023∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
post -0.001 -0.193∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.034)
Year FE N Y N Y
State FE Y N Y N
Industry-year FE Y N Y N
State-industry FE N Y N Y
Observations 16,540 16,540 16,540 16,540
Adjusted R2 0.099 0.235 0.036 0.116
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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Table 1.12: Asset Complementarity and Inventor Collaboration - State Robustness
The table reports the results of asset complementarity and inventor collaboration channel with state or state-
industry fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) examine changes in the asset complementarity using self-citation
as the measure. In Column (2), I include pre-treatment average count of submitted applications and its
interaction with the post dummy to control for any mechanical relationship between number of applications
submitted and self-citations driving the difference in response of asset complementarity. Columns (3) and
(4) examine inventor collaboration. Columns (1), (2), and (3) include state and industry-year fixed effects,
and Column (4) includes year and state-industry fixed effects. For variable definitions and details of their
construction, see Appendix A3. All standard errors are clustered by state.
yit = α+ β1 treati × postt + δs + θjt + it
yit = α+ β1 treati × postt + β2postt + β3 Controli + β4 Controli × postt + γt + λsj + it
Log(1+self citation) Avg. inventors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
treat×post 0.191∗∗ 0.121∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.066) (0.037) (0.029)
post 0.846 0.503∗∗ -0.155
(1.337) (0.223) (0.409)
Year FE N N N Y
State FE Y Y Y N
Industry-year FE Y Y Y N
State-industry FE N N N Y
Control – Avg.app count – –
Observations 15,489 15,489 13,095 13,095
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.639 0.078 0.122
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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Table 1.13: Patent Productivity and Successful Patent Applications - State Robustness
The table reports the results of underlying patent productivity channel with state-industry fixed effects. In
Columns (1) and (2), I measure the productivity using log of number of granted patents. In Columns (3)
and (4), I scale the number of eventually granted patents by total number of applications submitted in a
year to measure the percentage of successful patents, then multiply the ratio by 100. For all specifications, I
include the firm age and its interaction term with the post dummy to control for firm’s age and experience in
patenting driving the differential outcomes. The odd-numbered columns include state and industry-year fixed
effects, and the even-numbered columns use more stringent specification including year and state-industry
fixed effects. For variable definitions and details of their construction, see Appendix A3. All standard errors
are clustered by state.
yit = α+ β1 treati × postt + β2 Controli + β3 Controli × postt + δs + θjt + it
yit = α+ β1 treati × postt + β2postt + β3 Controli + β4 Controli × postt + γt + λsj + it
Log(1+grant) % successful app
(1) (2) (3) (4)
treat×post 0.144∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 1.353 2.066
(0.055) (0.055) (1.579) (1.712)
post -0.379 -65.238∗∗∗
(1.514) (12.345)
Year FE N Y N Y
State FE Y N Y N
Industry-year FE Y N Y N
State-industry FE N Y N Y
Application year FE Y Y – –
Control Firm age Firm age Firm age Firm age
Observations 10,330 10,330 10,976 10,976
Adjusted R2 0.140 0.283 0.128 0.178
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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Table 1.14: Citations on New and Old Patents - State Robustness
The table reports the results of improvement in economic value of new and existing patents with state-
industry fixed effects. In Columns (1) and (2), I measure the average citations received per patent in the first
3-years after the grant year to compare across patents of different age. In Columns (3) and (4), I measure the
average citations received per existing patent to compare citations received on the same portfolio of patents
over time. In the odd-numbered columns, I allow for differential trends by average age of pre-treatment
patent portfolio. In the even-numbered columns, I further allow for differential trends by average age of
pre-treatment patent portfolio and size of patent portfolio. For each patent portfolio age and patent stock
size controls, I include the variables alone and their interaction term with the post dummy. For variable
definitions and further details of their construction, see Appendix A3. All specification include firm and
industry-year fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered by state.
yit = α+ β1 treati × postt + β2 Controli + β3 Controli × postt + δs + θjt + it
yit = α+ β1 treati × postt + β2 postt + β3 Controli + β4 Controli × postt + γt + λsj + it
Avg. citations First 3-yr citations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
treat×post 0.585∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗ 0.176 0.134
(0.199) (0.187) (0.109) (0.085)
post 5.664∗∗∗ 3.572∗∗∗
(1.278) (0.960)
Year FE N Y N Y
State FE Y N Y N
Industry-year FE Y N Y N
State-industry FE N Y N Y
Controls Portfolio Age Portfolio Age Portfolio Age Portfolio Age
Patent Stock Patent Stock Patent Stock Patent Stock
Observations 10,695 10,695 10,695 10,695
Adjusted R2 0.203 0.215 0.066 0.090
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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CHAPTER II
Patent Litigation and Innovation Competition
2.1 Abstract
Using novel hand-collected patent litigation data from 2000-2006, we show that patent lit-
igation has important financial and real impacts on firms. We find that defendant firms
experience declining financial flexibility and innovation activities, and shift innovation strat-
egy to pursue more exploitative projects. The product market overlap exacerbates financial
constraints of defendants in intra-industry litigation, whereas a large reduction of litigation
probability when pursuing exploitative innovation intensifies narrower innovation scope for
defendants in inter-industry litigation. We sharpen our results by instrumenting the proba-
bility of being sued and the timing of patent litigation using China’s participation in TRIPS
(Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) agreement. Lastly, we find sugges-
tive evidence that patent litigation has spillover effects on other non-litigated firms in the
industry.
2.2 Introduction
The importance of intellectual property for firms has increased over time, and patent
litigation has become an important means of actively protecting firms’ valuable patent in-
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tellectual property. Costly patent litigation1 hurts firms’ financial health and, more impor-
tantly, deters firms’ subsequent innovation activities and product market competition by
aggravating investment frictions. A sharp increase in non-practicing entity (NPE)2 patent
litigation has attracted much attention from the academia and led to a number of important
papers (e.g., Mezzanotti (2015), Cohen, Gurun, and Kominers (2016)) that focus directly
on NPE litigation. However, a limitation of NPE litigation is that NPE litigation cannot,
by nature, address how interactions of operating firms directly contribute to innovation and
product market competition.
In this paper, we use our hand-collected patent litigation data to examine the real con-
sequences of patent litigation on operating firms. Existing studies (Bhagat, Brickley, and
Coles (1994), Bhagat, Bizjak, and Coles (1998), Mezzanotti (2015)) have found substantial
negative value impact of corporate litigation in general. Building on these earlier studies,
we add substantial details of how firms’ investments and innovation strategy change in the
context of product market competition, both of which help explain what underlying changes
induce the declining firm values. In order to highlight the industry dynamics of patent lit-
igation, we further divide our sample cases into intra- and inter-industry cases to capture
the significance of product market relevance of patent litigation consequences. The product
market relevance also differentiate patent litigation from securities litigation, where the lat-
ter is about disputes between firm and its investors with regards to governance, frauds, and
disclosure rule violations.
We derive our economic intuition of patent litigation from Lanjouw and Lerner (1997)
model and identify legal expense, damages awards, and the probability of winning case as
important key parameters in the endogenous enforcement process. We first find that patent
litigation costs decrease financial flexibility of firms. Since defendants are likely to bear
1The median litigation costs and damage awards have reached $5 million and $17 million per case AIPLA
(2015). These financial burdens and subsequent product market difficulties are well-described in the examples
in the Appendix B1.
2Non-practicing entities amass patents not fro producing commercial products, but in order to claim
license fees and/or litigate infringement on their patent portfolios.
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greater financial burden of paying damages awards, we find that defendant firms experience
larger decline in financial flexibility than plaintiff firms do. We show that defendant firms’
cash level falls by $20 million after patent litigation. The number of firms paying dividends
also decline by 5.6% following litigation.
Next, we show how litigation costs curtail innovation activities relatively more for de-
fendant firms. The costs associated patent litigation push up the hurdle for taking positive
NPV project. We measure firms’ innovation activities by the number of patent applications
and find that it declines by 35%. The number of citations received by defendants also falls
by 4%. This may be due to the increase in perceived costs of potential patent litigation
for firms using technology related to the asserted patent, in case it is found invalid. These
results lead us to investigate industry spillover effect of patent litigation. We indeed find
that a greater number of firms targeted as defendants decreases industry-wide innovation,
as measured by the number of patent applications.
The first part of the analyses relies on a difference-in-difference framework to capture
the relative effects of patent litigation between plaintiffs and defendants. However, we ac-
knowledge that the types of litigant and the timing of patent litigation are both endogenous
variables. For example, the weakening financial health may have attracted more patentees
to target alleged infringers to take advantage of relative financial flexibility, thus resulting
in reverse causality. Therefore, we attempt to mitigate such confounding effects by using
instrumental variable approach. We use the passage of TRIPS agreement between China
and the US in 2001, which strengthened the incentive of the US firms to enforce intellectual
property rights against potential US rival entrants to the China market. We find qualita-
tively consistent results using the instrumental variable approach.
As emphasized in the beginning, the essence of patent litigation entails product market
competition. Therefore, we further divide our sample depending on whether plaintiffs and
defendants are in the same industry or not to further understand how the product market
relevance plays out in patent litigation. We define intra-industry litigation cases as a dispute
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between two opposing firms in the same 3-digit SIC. We first re-characterize the key patent
litigation parameters by intra- and inter-industry case and generally find that there are
greater product market overlap between intra-industry litigants and larger damages awards,
which amplify the financial damages and deteriorating innovation activities. In regression
results, we verify that the negative financial and innovation activities results we found earlier
strengthen substantially for intra-industry cases.
Finally, we provide details of how patent litigation change firms’ innovation strategy. We
find that firms generally pursue safer innovation strategy in narrower scope. On a patent-
level, firms develop more exploitative patents. On a firm-level, firms cut down on general
acquisitions but increase same-industry acquisitions by 56%, which is indicative of firms
focusing on the core business and technology. We further investigate the types of external
R&D investments. The corporate venture capital (CVC) investments decrease by 10%, con-
sistent with pursuing safer innovation strategy, as CVC investments are known as a means
to explore and experiment with new technology outside of firms’ boundaries. Lastly, we
find that the breadth of business segments decline by 7.7% for defendant firms after patent
litigation, suggesting that the narrower focus may have caused defendant firms to close down
on remotely related business segments.
The last part of the analyses with firms’ exploitative innovation strategy seem to reflect
that higher uncertainty associated with innovation activities discourages the pursuit of long-
term risky R&D projects (Cohen, Levin, and Mowery (1987), Nohria and Gulati (1996),
Gao, Hsu, and Li (2018), Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, and Manova (2010)). This is also
consistent with Lerner (1995) that higher uncertainty about the quality of patent litigation
increases the chance of disputes reaching trial instead of settlement. We provide additional
evidence that given being involved in a patent litigation as a defendant in year t, shifting to-
wards exploitative innovation strategy in year t+ 1 reduces the probability of being targeted
as a defendant in the same year t+ 1. This result supports that the exploitative innovation
strategy is an effective way to hedge away future patent litigation risks.
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This paper contributes to a few related literature. This paper expands patent litigation
literature by showing important inter-firm dynamics and innovation competition between op-
erating entities. Our paper differentiates from the patent litigation studies focusing on NPE
patent litigation (Cohen et al. (2016), Mezzanotti (2015),Appel, Farre-Mensa, and Simintzi
(2017)) in three important ways. First, by focusing on patent litigation between operating
firms, we provide evidence of inter-firm dynamics that form innovation and product market
competition, which are absent in NPE patent litigation by nature. Second, whereas the NPE
litigation is largely driven by monetary gains from suing cash rich defendants, we do not find
evidence of such cash-driven motives. The diverging litigation effects between plaintiffs and
defendants and stronger intra-industry litigation effects clearly differentiate the motivation
of litigation of operating firms from that of NPE firm. Lastly, building on previous studies,
we do not only show the adverse effects of patent litigation, but we also additionally focus
on providing in-depth analyses of how affected firms’ innovation strategies change in terms
of both internal and external R&D efforts.
This paper also builds on broader corporate litigation literature. Existing corporate liti-
gation studies focus on corporate fraud (e.g., Karpoff and Lott Jr. (1993), Dyck, Morse, and
Zingales (2010)), shareholder litigation (e.g., Lin, Liu, and Manso (2016)), environmental-
related litigation (Karpoff, Lott, and Rankine (1999)), antitrust litigation (Bizjak and Coles
(1995)) and general inter-firm litigation (Bhagat et al. (1994)). Unlike corporate fraud or
shareholder litigation that stem from managerial agency problem, patent litigation highlights
operating risk for firms with large intellectual properties. This paper shows findings consis-
tent with Bhagat et al. (1994) that litigation leads to decline in financial flexibility. However,
we provide additional important details on changes in the types, modes, and breadth of firms’
innovation strategies specific to patent litigation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.3 develops hypotheses. Sample
data, variable definitions, and summary statistics are reported in Section 2.4. Section 2.5
describes our empirical approach. Section 2.6 presents the main results, and Section 2.7
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concludes.
2.3 Hypothesis Development
In this section, we derive our economic framework from Lanjouw and Lerner (1997) model
and develop our hypotheses from the key parameters identified in the model. A patentee
makes a decision on whether to go trial or to settle a patent dispute with an infringer. The
decision is based on comparing the settlement payoff with the expected payoff from going
to trial, which depends on the probability of winning the case (W , w), damages awards (j),
and legal expenses (L, l). The patentee’s decision comes down to weighing between litiga-
tion costs saved when settle and expected damages awards earned when reaching a trial.
Equation (9) in Lanjouw and Lerner (1997) describes a patentee’s decision from patentee’s
expected payoff, (Y +Wαj−L) +Max{0, θ[(L+ l)− j(Wα−w)]}. If the settlement profit
in the term in the bracket is negative, the case will go to trial, and if it is positive, the case
will settle. Therefore, we focus on the damages awards, legal costs, and the probability of
winning trial to develop our empirical predictions in the following hypotheses on the real
consequences of patent litigation using the comparative statics on these key parameters.3
Hypothesis 1: Patent litigation costs decrease financial flexibility.
Patent litigation is costly. According to AIPLA (2015), the median patent litigation costs
(L, l) has increased from $4.5 million to $5.0 million between 2005 and 2015 for firms with
more than $25 million risk. Also, the median damages (j) awarded range from $2 million
to $17 million over 1997-2016, and as much as $2.5 billion for mega-award granted in 2016
(PWC , 2017). Damages awards are not required to be reported on dockets. There are
112 cases with reported damages awards in our data. Breaking down into different types
of damages awards, our data shows that the lost profits range between $2.2 million and
3We are mainly interested in comparative statics with respect to damages awards on financial variables (i.e.
∂Cash
∂j ,
∂Div
∂j ,
∂Leverage
∂j ,
∂Growth
∂j ) and innovation output outcome variables (i.e.
∂NumApplication
∂j ,
∂Citations
∂j ).
Innovation strategy variables are considered with respect to actions that change the probability of winning
case W and w (i.e. ∂InnovationScope∂W ).
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$57.4 million. The reasonable royalty ranges from $88,000 to $45.3 million. We expect that
both plaintiffs and defendants to experience financial constraints post litigation, but since
defendants are accountable for damages awards, if found to have infringed the patentee’s
technology, defendants’ financial burden will be larger. It is also important to note that if
legal expenses (L, l) are substantially larger than the damages awards (j), then cases are
likely to be settled most of the time. The median lost profits and reasonable royalty are
$8.9 million and $4.6 million, respectively, both of which are comparable or larger than the
median legal expenses of $5 million.
Hypothesis 2: Litigation costs reduce innovation activities.
As litigation costs increase, the threshold for taking positive NPV innovation project
also rises, forcing firms to forgo some of low return innovation projects on both firm- and
industry-level. As a result, we predict that the number of patent applications decrease af-
ter patent litigation. Furthermore, as patent citations capture the intricate web technology
users, we expect that patent litigation decreases the number of citations received by the
defendant patents. This reflects the increased perceived of cost of citing the asserted patent
for citing firms for the possibility of the asserted patent resulting in invalidity. This hints at
a potential industry spillover effects of patent litigation aggregate industry-level. We predict
that the greater the number of defendants in a given year in a given industry, the larger
reduction in industry-level innovation activities.
Hypothesis 3: The decrease in financial flexibility and innovation activities is more pro-
nounced in intra-industry case.
We divide our sample cases into intra- and inter-industry case in order to emphasize that
patent litigation is closely related to industry dynamics. We define categorize a case as an
intra-industry case when plaintiffs and defendants share the same 3-digit SIC code. By doing
so, we can re-characterize the key patent litigation parameters by intra- and inter-industry
cases.
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Our data shows that intra-industry case plaintiffs and defendants indeed overlap to a
larger degree in terms of technology and product market. The patent proximity, which mea-
sures the distance between vectors of patent classes of plaintiff and defendant pair, is higher
in intra-industry case (0.42) than in inter-industry case (0.31). Hoberg and Phillips (2016)
measure of text-based industry classification of product market rivals also is greater for intra-
industry cases. The score is 0.42 for intra-industry and 0.31 for inter-industry, which indicate
that the pair of firms in intra-industry cases are closer rivals in the product market. These
two measures ensure that intra-industry case litigants have greater product market overlap.
Therefore, the average damages award is larger in intra-industry cases ($9.60 million) com-
pared to inter-industry cases ($8.29 million), as damages awards account for the harm done
by an infringer on sales of the product related to an asserted patent.
The summary of key parameters above by intra- and inter-industry case alludes to a
greater chance of observing intra-industry case as the key parameters increase patentees’
incentives to go to trial. We confirm that there are greater number of intra-industry cases
(441) than inter-industry cases (390) in our data. These observations lead us to expect also
to find more pronounced negative effects of financial and innovation activities results for
intra-industry cases. This is mainly due to larger damages awards when there is greater
product market overlap as we have shown above.
Hypothesis 4: Firms choose exploitative innovation strategy after patent litigation to avoid
future litigation risks.
Lerner (1995) finds that greater uncertainty about the quality of case (i.e. the perceived
probability of winning the case) impedes settlement. Therefore, in order to avoid future
litigation risks, we expect firms to choose incremental patent development to stay closer to
the core technology that reduces the uncertainty about the quality of cases. In other words,
after patent litigation, firms will follow an exploitative innovation strategy.
We use a few proxies of narrower innovation scope. First, on a patent-level, we measure
the breadth of patents using the citations. An Exploitative patent uses existing patents and
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patents cited by those to capture how narrow is the trajectory of related technologies. On a
firm-level, we expect firms to focus more on same-industry acquisitions for external innova-
tion.
Another way to measure firms’ incentives to pursue exploitative innovation project is
to look at changes in corporate venture capital (CVC) investments. It is widely accepted
that firms use CVC to search for new technologies outside of firm boundaries (Fulghieri and
Seville (2009)) and to become more receptible to experimentation and exploration (Fulghieri
and Seville (2014), Ma (2016)). Therefore, we predict that firms trim down on CVC in-
vestments after patent litigation. The reduction of relatively distanced projects may also
result in a decrease in the number of business segments. Lastly, we verify that the vari-
ety of ways of pursuing exploitative innovation strategy lowers near future litigation risks
when conditioning on firms learning towards exploitative innovation projects after the patent
litigation.
2.4 Data and Summary Statistics
2.4.1 Data Source and Sample Selection
Our sample consists of S&P 500 firms that had at least one patent litigation during
our sample period between 2000 and 2006. We restrict our sample period to 2006 due to
significant structural changes in intellectual property rights after 2006. Particularly, patent
troll related litigations soared after 2006. Bessen and Meurer (2014) show that aggregate
direct costs4 of NPE patent litigations grew rapidly from about $7 billion in 2005 and 2006,
to $11 billion in 2007 and $29 billion in 2011. The NPE patent assertions account for
about 70% of patent litigations in 2012, a 270% increase over 26% in 2006. In 2006, a
patent dispute by NPT Inc., a patent holding company, nearly caused the shutdown of
BlackBerry wireless service, and reached a $612.5 million settlement. This successful NPE
4Aggregate director cost includes all legal costs, settlement costs, and other full costs for currently unre-
solved lawsuits.
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suit, which was quite rare before 2006, gained Congress attention and media spotlight.5 In the
information and communication technology (ICT) segment, furthermore, there were many
structural changes in product market and regulations around 2007 with the introductions
of new technologies such as iPhone, cloud computing service infrastructure, and flash-based
hard drive. Given many confounding factors causing a spurious relation between patent
litigation and real consequence in product market competition, our sample period is a clearer
setting for examining the implications of patent litigation on product market competition.
There are two main sources of data. The first is Lex Machina. Lex Machina provides
patent litigations in detail starting in January, 2000. The database leverages primary data
source from PACER, the USPTO, and ITC, and offers comprehensive information about each
patent litigation. We hand-collect information on litigants and asserted patents involved in
a case, damage amounts,6 judges, courts, and final decisions. We keep cases that involve
at least one S&P 500 firm in the litigation.7 The second source of data is NBER patent
database (Hall et al., 2001). We match our sample firms to NBER’s pdpass firm identifier
and obtain detailed patents owned by our sample firms. Since NBER data ends in 2006 and
Lex Machina starts in 2000, our sample period is restricted between 2000 to 2006.
Overall, our sample data consists of 473 unique S&P 500 firms, 1,692 unique cases, and
2,620 unique firm-case observations. The number of unique firm-case observation implies
that some cases involve non-S&P 500 firm as counterparty. In the next section, we describe
our sample litigations in detail and characteristics of firms by plaintiff and defendant.
5See more “BlackBerry Maker Reaches Deal in Patent Dispute,” The New York Times, 2006 March and
the government hearing in 2006, “Patent Trolls: Fact or Fiction,” 2006 June
6Not all cases disclose the damage amount. We leave the unreported damages as missing in the data.
7Surprisingly, none of our sample cases seems to involve litigation against non-practicing entities (NPEs
or “trolls”). One possible reason is that since the objective of NPEs centers around monetary gains, these
cases may settle before reaching a trial.
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2.4.2 Summary Statistics
2.4.2.1 Patent Litigation Summary
Table 2.1 Panel A describes our sample patent litigation cases. There are total 1,692
S&P 500 firm associated cases in our sample. We exclude 16 cases that are still on-going
lawsuits without case termination date.8 In our sample, 76% cases are initiated by S&P 500
plaintiff firms. Of these cases, only 18% of the cases reach final verdict, and around 70% of
cases are dismissed after being filed. Conditional on reaching verdict, about 65% of cases
are won by the plaintiffs, which suggests that firms are more likely to reach trial if there is
high probability of winning ex ante.
The average length of litigation is about 2 years, and each case has on average 1.31
plaintiffs and 1.90 defendants.9 About 60% of cases are intra-industry cases, where plaintiffs
and defendants are in the same industry based on two-digit SIC. The average total damage
awards in our sample is $7.3 million,10 which is also consistent with the previously referenced
number for PWC (2017). Note that damage awards are not always reported in case dockets,
and we only have 112 cases with reported damage awards.
We acknowledge that many patent assertions can reach to the settlement before actual
trials. Those settlements that are not observed in our litigation sample. In our litigation
sample, 18% of trials end up with a verdict during our sample and about 70% of trials are
dismissed. We expect that patent litigations ending up in actual trials are the ones that face
fiercer product market competition. Usually damage rewards are three times larger than
settlement costs, and thus firms will settle before reaching trials if the expected payoff/cost
of litigation is greater than settlement costs. Therefore, it is likely that our litigation sample
may capture the cases with greater economic importance.
8The results are robust after including those on-going lawsuits.
9Since our sample include only litigants who can be identified in Compustat, these numbers constitute
the lower bounds.
10In untabulated table, we also report damages from litigation, computed as a net amount. Damages
paid are negative numbers and received are positive number. The average net damage amount is positive
given our sample firms are more likely to be plaintiffs in sample cases, and they are also more likely to win,
receiving damages from their opponent firms.
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2.4.2.2 Firm Characteristics Summary
Table 2.1 Panel B reports summary statistics of patent portfolios on firm-level as of 2006.
The number of unique firms in our sample is 159 and 271, with and without non-S&P 500
opponent firms, respectively. Our sample firms have mean (median) of 1,450 (139) patents
in their portfolio and a mean (median) age of 10.9 (10.4) years-old. The average number of
claims on patents and truncation-adjusted citations received are 18.6 and 16.4, respectively.
Lastly, our sample firms hold relatively more of explorative patents that uses and are related
to a wide variety of technology fields.
Panel C describes financial characteristics of our sample firms. The average leverage of
0.21 is relatively large for R&D-intensive firm. However, keep in mind that our sample firms
consist of S&P 500 firms, therefore the leverage ratio of 0.21 may actually be on the lower
end compared to other non R&D-intensive firms. Also, note that our sample firms have
relatively high average Q and are in highly competitive industries.
In order to give some reference statistics, we also report comparisons between litigated
firms and never-litigated firms, using all S&P 500 firms between 2000 and 2006 in Table
2.2 Panel A. In terms of financials, litigated and never-litigated firms are similar, except
for the size and acquisitions. The innovation dimensions shows stark differences, however.
Litigated firms have statistically significantly higher R&D expenses and Tobin’s Q and are
more profitable. These are intuitive differences because patent litigation would be common
among firms actively pursuing innovation. Also, highly profitable firms have the financial
ability to bear the high litigation costs as well as more likely to attract potential litigants.
Furthermore, Litigated firms have much larger patent portfolios and generally higher quality
patents. Note that the raw number of citations seems to be higher for never-litigated firms
due to skewness. When we take the log of the number of citations, litigated firms have
statistically significantly greater number of citations received.
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2.4.3 Determinants of Patent Litigation
As we emphasized in the introduction, patent litigation is likely related to firms’ inno-
vation strategies and product market relationships, beyond the individual patent character-
istics. The goal of this paper is to capture such firm-level characteristics and interactions
of firms in the product market together which lead to patent litigation. Earlier studies of
patent litigation has focused and identified the patent-level determinants of patent litiga-
tion. Before we present our main firm-level analyses, we briefly describe the determinants
of patent litigation and ensure that our data exhibits similar characteristics to earlier small
sample patent litigation studies.
In Appendix Table B1, we report regression of different types of patent litigation on
firms’ innovation, financials, and industry characteristics. It is important to note that this
table presents the probability of different types of patent litigation, and not the probability
of any litigation, because our sample consists only of firms involved patent litigation.
Table B1 suggests that firms with high quality and original patents are likely to be-
come plaintiffs and take initiative in protecting patents (Column (1)). Also, firms with
greater cash-to-assets ratio are likely to become defendants. Both results are consistent
with previous studies that the economic value of patents as well as the level of cash stock
are important determinants of patent litigation (Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004, Allison,
Lemley, and Walker 2009). In column (3), we find that large firms with highly original
patents, though not necessarily large stock of patents, large R&D spending, and relatively
low industry-median Q tend to be involved in within industry cases. The results suggest
that large innovative firms are likely to lean on patent litigation to protect its proprietary
technology and secure competitive position in the product market.
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2.5 Empirical Approach
Our main analysis approach is difference-in-difference regressions. We define our “treat-
ment” group as defendant firms11 and compare the relative changes in outcome variables two
years before and after patent litigation.12 We use difference-in-difference analysis to capture
the differential impact of patent litigation on different types of litigant around the patent
litigation.
Yi,j,t = β0 + β1Afteri,j,t × Defendanti,j,t + β2Afteri,j,t + β3Defendanti,j,t
+β
′
Xi,t + αi + αt + εi,j,t
where i indexes portfolio firms, j indexes litigation cases, t indexes years, Yi,j,t is a dependent
variable. After is a dummy variable that equals one after litigation year, and zero before
and including litigation year. Defendant is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is
defendant in litigation case, otherwise zero. The year fixed effects and firm fixed effects to re-
move common time trend in corporate policy and time-invariant unobservables, respectively.
We cluster standard errors at case level.13 The resulting difference-in-difference coefficient
captures the changes in defendant firm outcome variables relative to the changes in plaintiff
firm outcome variables, post-treatment.
We acknowledge that our “treatment” is non-random (also discussed in Section 2.4.3 De-
terminants of Patent Litigation), and also have shown that the defendant firms are somewhat
different from the plaintiff firms from Panel B of Table 2.2. The non-random treatment and
the endogenous timing of patent litigation can cause several limitations in drawing causal
inference. For example, firms with strong innovation outcome may attract more asserted
claims because rival firms using similar technology may wait until the profits from the al-
11The designation of treatment group is arbitrary. Since our sample data consists of firms with at least
one patent litigation, the difference-in-difference coefficients can be interpreted in exactly the opposite way
with defining plaintiff firms as a treatment group.
12For robustness, we also use different windows for treatment period. The results are robust.
13Our main results are qualitatively robust to firm-level clustering.
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legedly infringing patent build up to maximize the expected profit from patent litigation.
The unobservable drivers of decision to initiate patent litigation that are correlated with
firms’ financial health, innovation strategy, or product market position would cause differ-
ential outcome even without patent litigation. Given these limitations, we try to provide
comparisons of pre-litigation trends in the set of outcome variables to ensure that the de-
fendant and plaintiff firms have similar trends in observable dimensions prior to litigation to
understand the direction of any possible bias on the difference-in-difference estimate.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Financial and Innovation Outcomes
2.6.1.1 Financial Outcome
In this section, we present firm-level financial and innovation activities consequences of
patent litigation. Again, the main coefficients of interests describe the additional changes
in the outcome variables of defendant firms relative to plaintiff firms. In Table 2.3 Columns
(1) and (2), we find that defendant firms’ cash level declines sharply by 1 percentage point,
or by 5.8%, and the number of defendant firms paying dividend declines by 4 percentage
points, or by 5.6%. The results confirm that firms experience mounting financial constraints
as they go through costly patent litigation.
In Columns (3)-(5), we also find an increase in leverage by 4 percentage points and
decreases in asset growth and market share by 7 percentage points and 20%, respectively.
The leverage seems to increase rather due to shrinking asset size, which is likely to be
associated with firms’ exploitive innovation strategy by cutting down on investments and
business segments remotely related to firms’ core technologies. We document changes in
firms’ innovation activities and strategies in the next two sections. We avoid including
controls that may also be affected by patent litigation in our main regressions. Including
them will cause our estimates to be biased and inconsistent. However, we report regressions
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that include a few controls in the Appendix Table B2 as a reference.
We briefly comment about the magnitude of our finding before discussing about potential
selection issues. The decrease in cash translates to $105 million. The most relevant study to
ours is ?, which finds that firm values of the plaintiff and defendant jointly drop by about
1%, or $20 million, after upon the announcement of inter-firm litigation related to corporate
control, breach of contract, patent infringement, antitrust, and others between 1981 and
1983. The authors also find that patent infringement-specific lawsuits result in decrease of
firm value by 1.89% ($80 million) for defendants, 0.09% ($3.5 million) for plaintiffs, and
3.13% for pairs. Compared to these, our financial results, although not directly comparable,
may seem too large. However, given that our sample firm market equity is ten-times larger,
the magnitude of changes in our result seems reasonable, particularly as we focus on the
S&P 500 firms.
We acknowledge that the baseline regression may suffer from endogeneity. First, one may
be concerned that financially weaker firms tend to be attacked by rivals. This is unlikely
because defendants that are unable to raise capital to finance litigation would be forced
to settle the dispute regardless of the ultimate merit of the case. This means that firms
with deteriorating pre-treatment financial condition is less likely to show up in our sample.
Second, firms with higher chance of intellectual property (IP) legal dispute may be more
likely to protect their risk through IP insurance, which reimburses the litigation expenses
either to enforce IP against infringers or defend against charges of infringing other companies’
IP rights. However, this endogenous selection would likely bias our results toward finding
no effect of the treatment and thus it is unlikely to drive our results.
2.6.1.2 Innovation Activities
We further explore how firms’ innovation activity changes. The financial costs of patent
litigation limit firms’ ability to take on all positive NPV projects, which then slows down
innovation activities. We measure innovation activity by the number of application because
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the effects measured by the number of granted patents show up with some time lags. Table
2.4 Column (1) and (2) show that defendants’ number of patent applications declines by
35%, and the number of citations also declines by 4%. The decrease in citation is indicative
of the citing firms’ fear of finding the asserted patents invalid, which would increase patent
litigation risks and reduce the citing firms’ expected profit. To check if the patent application,
citations, and particularly patent grant have delayed response, we run the regressions again
by focusing on the effects in the first, second, and third year after litigation individually in
each columns of Table B5. Our results are consistent with the main regression results.
It appears that patent litigation does not only affect firms in-house R&D but also external
acquisitions of technology. The results are presented in Columns (3) and (4). We find
defendant firms’ number and size of acquisitions fall by 10% and 45%, respectively.14 Again,
it is important to note that the reduction in the number and size of acquisitions is related to
firms’ post-litigation innovation strategies to pursue exploitive innovation projects that we
discuss in Section 2.6.4 later.
The citation result hints at potential industry-level spillover effects of patent litigation, as
patents are intricate web of related technology users. Panel A Table 2.5 presents how patent
litigation has spillover effects to non-litigant firms in the same industry in terms of innovation
activities. The more firms involved in patent litigation as defendants in a given industry, the
lower the industry-level innovation productivity by 20%. Similarly, Panel B shows that the
industry-wide external acquisitions decline by 3%. This negative externality can be socially
inefficient because it may cause a holdup problem where excessive IP rights lead rival firms
to underinvestment in innovation and hurt consumers (Galetovic, Haber, and Levine (2015)).
Overall, the results in this section show that patent litigation has economically significant
financial impact on defendant firms, and thus reduce litigant firms’ incentives to innovate.
14The declining acquisition results are reflective of the example of Johnson & Johnson’s and Boston
Scientific case in the Appendix B1, where after settling a series of patent disputes in losses, Boston Scientific
experienced financial difficulties that led to fewer acquisitions.
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2.6.2 Matching and Instrumental Variable Approach
The observable level differences between defendant and plaintiff firms are not problematic
for consistency of our regression coefficient because the level differences between defendant
and plaintiff firms are fully accounted for by the treatment indicator. However, to pro-
vide robustness of our previous results that these results are not driven by the observable
differences, we use propensity score matching and re-estimate our difference-in-difference
regressions for robustness.
2.6.2.1 Propensity Score Matching Regressions
We first estimate propensity scores using a probit regression, where the outcome variable
is equal to one in the year a firm is involved in patent litigation as a defendant and zero
otherwise. We use all the S&P 500 sample firms that had at least one patent litigation for the
period of 2000-2006, but exclude sample firms that were involved as plaintiff and defendant
in separate patent litigations in a certain year. To calculate the propensity score, we use
variables including firm-level patent portfolio characteristics (Number of Patent, Number of
Claims, Assigned Number, Originality, Adjusted Citation) and financial characteristics (Size,
R&D, Profitability, Tangibility, Market/Book ratio, Cash Flow Volatility). It is important to
note that we also use the pre-litigation period growth rate of the outcome variables to ensure
that we take into account the parallel trend assumption. We then match one controlled
firm that involved in litigation as a plaintiff for each treated firm based on the predicted
probability of being a defendant. After the propensity score matching, the difference in
average propensity score between the treated and control groups decreases significantly from
44% to 15%. In appendix, we report probit regression result, and report post-match result
and verify that most covariates become statistically insignificant, suggesting a successful
matching process.
The results using a propensity score matching sample are reported in Table 2.6. The
results are qualitatively consistent with Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. Both the Panel A and
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Panel B show that the financial and innovation activity results remain robust although the
number of observation decreases due to matching. The similar matching coefficients ensure
that the matched covariates above did not cause the differential trends in each of the outcome
variables in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4.
2.6.2.2 Instrumental Variable Regressions
In this section, we attempt to further sharpen our tests by addressing the endogeneity
by exploiting an exogenous shock on the timing and probability of becoming a patent liti-
gation defendant. In 2001, China overhauled the patent law to fulfill the obligations under
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (Hu and Jefferson (2009)).
Delgado, Kyle, and McGahan (2010) find that implementation of TRIPS is related to an
increase in trade in IP-dependent products compared with other sectors, indicating that
owners of IP received better profit protection with the implementation of TRIPS. Therefore,
we use our sample firm exposures to sales in China as an instrument variable.
An important identification assumption in instrumental variable regression is that the
shock affects firms’ financial and innovation policies only through the patent litigation. The
TRIPS shock has two important aspects. First, the timing of TRIPS agreement, and specif-
ically the timing of China’s patent law overhaul is relatively free from any U.S. firm’s lobby-
ing towards particular financial policy. Also, given we measure exposure by the sales, which
largely depends on factors not under direct influence of the firm, for example demands in
China, it is less likely that, in anticipation of Chinese patent law overhaul, firms suddenly
increased exposures to China. Therefore, the effects we find in difference-in-difference re-
gression should account for the effects of patent litigation only through the TRIPS shock.
In column (1) of Panel A Table 2.7, the first stage regression shows that TRIPS in-
creases the probability of a sample firm becoming a defendant. The instrument variable Post
TRIPS takes the value of one after China’s TRIPS participation, for firms that any of their
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competitors in the same industry have China exposure before 2001, and zero otherwise.15
The first-stage regression has difference-in-difference interpretation. The coefficient on Post
TRIPS captures the relative changes in the probability of being sued in patent litigation for
firms with sales exposure in China. In untabulated table, we also control for covariates and
find that most of the covariates are statistically significant, alleviating concerns for weak
instruments, and the adjusted R-square is high, which suggests that the TRIPS shock is rel-
evant. This probit result ensures that the TRIPS shock is a valid instrument. The following
regression results are reported in Table 2.7. The results are strengthened and qualitatively
consistent with difference-in-difference results. We find that defendant firms still experience
weakened patent outcomes, take on less innovative projects and acquisitions, which implies
losing competitive position in the product market.
2.6.3 Intra- and inter-industry Patent Litigation
The important driver of patent litigation is to protect the boundary of a firm’s intel-
lectual boundary, which also determines the competitiveness of the firm’s position in the
product market. To emphasize the product market relevance of patent litigation, we cate-
gorize cases into intra- and inter-industry. A case is categorized as intra(inter)-industry if
plaintiffs and defendants share the same (different) 3-digit SIC. Consistent with our predic-
tions, Table 2.8 Panel A shows that most of patent litigation effects come from intra-industry
cases. As we described in the hypothesis development section, intra-industry case litigants
indeed have greater product market overlap, as measured by technology proximity and text-
based industry classification rival scores, and the greater product market overlap predicts
more pronounced patent litigation effects for intra-industry cases due to larger litigation
costs exacerbating financing constraints and thus even lower innovation activities. Table
2.8 emphasizes the importance of patent litigation as a means of innovation competition by
highlighting the role of financial fatness partly related to predation motive of patentees. This
15We obtain regional sales distribution data for S&P500 sample firms from Factset database.
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is also clearly different from NPE patent litigation motives.
2.6.4 Innovation Strategy
This section provides substantial details of how firms change their investments and inno-
vation strategy following patent litigation with variety of proxies for the scope of innovation.
First, we quantitatively capture the changes in firms’ innovation strategies following Gao
et al. (2018) measures of innovation. A patent is categorized as exploitative if 80% or more
of its citations are based on a firm’s existing patents and the citations made by those patents,
whereas a patent is categorized as exploratory if 80% more more of its citations are based on
new knowledge outside of a firm’s existing patents or the citations made by those patents.
Then we scale the total number of exploitative/exploratory patents over year t-2 to year t
by the total number of patent application over the same period, which gives us continuous
time-varying measure of innovation strategy. Table 2.9 Column (1) and (2) show that de-
fendant firm patents become more exploitative.
Column (3)-(5) presents narrower scope of innovation projects in terms of innovation
done outside the firm’s boundary. In relation to cutting down on acquisitions in Columns
(3) and (4) in Table 2.4, Column (3) in Table 2.9 shows that defendant firms appear to trim
down less-related industry acquisitions and focus more on same-industry acquisitions, which
is indicative of technologically-driven acquisitions suggested by Bena and Li (2014). More
interestingly, we find firms invest 10% less in corporate venture capital (CVC).16 Innovative
firms often use CVC as means to be more open to experimentation and exploration (Ful-
ghieri and Seville (2009)) and to undertake R&D investments outside of firms’ boundaries
16We obtain Corporate VC fund- and portfolio firm-specific information from Thomson Reuters Ventur-
eXpert database for the period 1995-2010. VentureXpert, which has been used extensively in the prior litera-
ture (Fulghieri and Seville (2014), Bernstein, Giroud, and Townsend (2015)), provides detailed firm-specific
funding information. We calculate the CVC investment variable that captures the total number/investment
amount of CVC on entrepreneurial firms.
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to exploit new technologies (Fulghieri and Seville (2014), Ma (2016)).17 Therefore, the de-
crease in CVC investment captures defendant firms reduction of scope of innovation that
increases potential probability of future patent litigation. We also find that defendant firms
reduce the number of business segments after litigation. This is consistent with the negative
asset growths shown in Table 2.3 as defendant firm’s cutting down on less related business
segments both inside and outside the firm.
Lastly, we provide evidence that the exploitative innovation strategy indeed seems to
hedge some of the future patent litigation risks. Table 2.10 tests whether pursuing exploita-
tive innovation strategy in the year following patent litigation for a defendant reduce the
probability of begin accused as an infringer in the near future. The result shows that defen-
dant firms that narrow down the scope of innovation in the year following patent litigation
becomes defendant in future patent litigation less frequently.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the real consequences of patent litigation on corporate finan-
cial flexibility, innovation output, and innovation strategy. We consider patent litigation as
a form of product market competition. Hence, we emphasize the product market relevance
in understanding the effects of patent litigation.
To derive our predictions on the impact of patent litigation, we borrow the stylized model
of patent enforcement from Lanjouw and Lerner (1997). The model allows us to focus our
analyses around the key parameters that determine the patentee’s decision to go to trial
against an infringer. We are able to build our hypotheses on the comparative statics on the
key patent litigation parameters that are observable in our hand-collected data.
We show that patent litigation weakens firms’ financial health, particularly more for
17In 2014, CVC investors participated in 656 deals totaling $12.31 billion. For example, Intel Capi-
tal invested 1100 start-up companies, and 189 of these portfolio firms went public and 258 of them are
acquired. Dow Venture extends to agriculture, consumer and life-stlye, energy, infrastructure and trans-
portation through CVC and Samsung Venture extensively invested in clean-tech and medical-tech.
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defendants who need to bear the burden of damages awards. We also find that such deterio-
ration in financial health reduces firms’ innovation output. More importantly, we show that
the intra-industry litigation that involves litigants with substantial overlap in the product
market has more pronounced effects. Additionally, we find evidence that firms choose more
exploitative innovation strategies to avoid future patent litigation risks by reducing the un-
certainty about the quality of potential cases.
Overall, using our novel hand-collected patent litigation data, we highlight the essence of
patent litigation as innovation competition for firms in innovation-intensive industries and
further extend the existing literature by providing detailed analyses of subsequent changes
in firms’ investment and innovation types.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
The table presents summary statistics for sample firms that have patent litigation records. The sample
comprises of 1,692 litigation cases that S&P 500 firm associated for the period of 2000-2006. Panel A
describes the patent litigation case characteristics in our sample. Panel B is a summary of firm-level patent
portfolio summary based on 2004. Panel C is financial and investment summary of all sample firms in our
sample.
Mean Std.dev Min Med Max Obs.
Panel A: Litigation Summary
Plaintiff (dummy) 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 1.00 1692
Defendant (dummy) 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 1692
Case with verdict 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 1692
Win case (conditional) 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 294
Dismissed case 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 1676
Transferred case 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 1676
Consolidated case 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00 1676
Case duration in years 1.98 1.86 0.01 1.00 13.00 1677
Num. of plaintiffs 1.31 0.65 1.00 1.00 5.00 1691
Num. of defendants 1.90 2.70 1.00 1.00 59.00 1691
Total damage (mil) 7.32 17.71 -1.76 0.15 101.23 112
Intra-ind. case 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 838
Panel B: Patent Summary
Number of patents 1450 3925 1.00 139 45213 401
Patent age 10.94 6.30 1.00 10.44 31.00 401
Assignee sequence number 1.01 0.03 1.00 1.00 1.33 401
Grant year 1996 6.30 1976 1996 2006 401
Application year 1993 5.90 1975 1994 2004 401
Number of claims 18.60 6.93 1.00 17.47 76.00 401
Adj. #Citations 16.43 22.68 0.00 11.83 386.50 401
Log(1+#Citations) 2.54 0.82 0.00 2.55 5.96 401
Exploitive 0.19 0.20 0.00 0.14 1.00 141
Explorative 0.70 0.25 0.00 0.75 1.00 141
Panel C: Financial and Investment Summary
Log(Assets) 8.96 1.27 5.65 8.84 13.53 880
Cash 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.10 0.88 880
Dividend 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00 880
Leverage 0.21 0.15 0.00 0.20 1.33 880
Assets growth 0.14 0.52 -0.61 0.06 9.72 880
Log(1+Number of Total Acquisition) 0.20 0.42 0.00 0.00 2.56 880
Log(1+Average Acquisition Size) 1.24 2.45 0.00 0.00 10.99 880
Same Industry Acquisition 0.09 0.40 0.00 0.00 6.00 880
Log(1+Number of CVC Deal) 0.37 0.82 0.00 0.00 5.38 880
Number of Segments 4.55 2.66 1.00 5.00 17.00 769
R&D Exp. 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.60 880
Profitability 0.14 0.08 -0.21 0.14 0.48 880
Tangibility 0.81 0.15 0.24 0.84 1.00 880
Tobin’s Q 2.25 1.94 0.08 1.64 29.32 880
CF Vol 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.02 1.10 880
1 - HHI 0.84 0.15 0.02 0.87 0.97 880
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Table 2.2: Univariate Analysis
The table presents summary statistics for the firms that have patent litigation records vs never-litigated
(Panel A) during the sample period of 2000-2006, and pre-treatment characteristics for the firms that are
plaintiff vs defendant (Panel B) in our sample patent litigation cases. In Panel A, the sample consists of 1,737
firm-year observations of S&P 500 firms during the period of 2000-2006. In Panel B, the sample consists of
1,692 cases by 137 S&P 500 firms during the sample period of 2000-2006. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Comparison between litigated and never-litigated firms
Litigated Never-litigated
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Difference
Log(Assets) 8.96 8.84 8.44 8.21 0.53***
Cash 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.00
Dividend 0.71 1.00 0.52 1.00 0.19***
Leverage 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.22 -0.01
Assets growth 0.14 0.06 0.15 0.05 -0.01
R&D Expense 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01**
Profitability 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.02***
Tangibility 0.81 0.84 0.81 0.85 0.00
Tobin’s Q 2.25 1.64 2.02 1.40 0.23**
CF Vol 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.00
1 - HHI 0.84 0.87 0.84 0.89 0.00
Number of patents 2,982 999 601 94 2,380***
Observations 880 857
Panel B: Pre-treatment comparison between plaintiff and defendant
Plaintiff Defendant
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Difference
Log(Assets) 9.00 8.90 9.29 9.52 -0.29***
Cash 0.17 0.10 0.18 0.12 -0.02
Dividend 0.70 1.00 0.71 1.00 -0.01
Leverage 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.00
Assets growth 0.13 0.06 0.14 0.06 -0.00
R&D Expense 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 -0.01**
Profitability 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.00
Tangibility 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.90 -0.03***
Tobin’s Q 2.30 1.61 2.26 1.61 0.05
CF Vol 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.00
Number of patents 3,239 1,024 4,949 2,461 -1,709***
Observations 614 286
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Table 2.3: The Effects of Patent Litigation: Financial Outcomes
The table examines the effects of patent litigation on corporate financial outcomes. The sample comprises
of 1,692 litigation cases that S&P 500 firm associated for the period of 2000-2006. For each litigation case,
we restrict the sample period from t-3 to t+3 year around the litigation filing date. In columns (1)-(5), the
dependent variables are corporate financial policy: total cash scaled by total assets (Cash), dividend payer
dummy (Dividend), leverage ratio using book value of total debt (Leverage)), assets growth rate (Asset
growth), and the market share based on 3-digit SIC (Mkt Share). In Panel A, we present results from
difference-in-difference analysis and in Panel B, we report the dynamics of the litigation effects. After is a
dummy variable that equals one after litigation year, and zero before and including litigation year. Defendant
is a dummy variable that equals one if firm is one of defendants in litigation case, otherwise zero. Year and
firm fixed effects are included. The variable t-1 year is an indicator variable equal to one if the observation
is recorded in the year preceding the litigation. t-3, t-2, t+1, t+2, t+3 year are dummy variables defined
analogously. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted for Case clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Diff-in-Diff Analysis on Financial Policies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash Dividend Dummy Leverage Asset growth Market Share
After X Defendant -0.01∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.20
(-2.95) (-3.03) (3.03) (-4.94) (-1.34)
Defendant 0.01∗∗ 0.01 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗
(2.41) (1.00) (-3.29) (3.35) (2.32)
After 0.00∗ 0.00 -0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(1.81) (0.21) (-0.90) (3.33) (5.27)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,099 10,099 10,099 10,099 10,099
Adjusted R2 0.871 0.882 0.670 0.159 0.979
Panel B: Dynamic Effects on Financial Policies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash Dividend Dummy Leverage Asset growth Market Share
t-3 year X Defendant 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.42∗∗
(0.92) (-0.27) (-0.99) (0.36) (-2.22)
t-2 year X Defendant 0.00 0.03∗∗ -0.00 0.11∗∗∗ 0.06
(0.71) (2.27) (-0.70) (2.84) (0.46)
t-1 year X Defendant -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.09
(-0.12) (0.83) (-0.89) (-0.63) (-1.06)
t+1 year X Defendant -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02 0.04∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ 0.09
(-2.67) (-1.63) (2.97) (-3.58) (1.02)
t+2 year X Defendant -0.01∗∗ -0.04∗∗ 0.03∗∗ -0.01 -0.21
(-2.40) (-2.27) (2.52) (-0.34) (-1.49)
t+3 year X Defendant -0.01 -0.04∗ 0.03∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.80∗∗∗
(-1.44) (-1.96) (3.16) (-3.41) (-4.10)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,099 10,099 10,099 10,099 10,099
Adjusted R2 0.871 0.882 0.671 0.162 0.979
75
Table 2.4: The Effects of Patent Litigation: Innovation Outcomes
The table examines the effects of patent litigation on corporate innovation outcomes. The sample comprises
of 1,692 litigation cases that S&P 500 firm associated for the period of 2000-2006. For each litigation case,
we restrict the sample period from t-3 to t+3 year around the litigation filing date. In columns (1)-(4),
the dependent variables are corporate innovation outcome and strategy: the log of one plus number of
patent applications at a certain year ((Log(1+Number of Patent Application)), the log of one plus adjusted
citation (Log(1+Number of Adj. Citations)), the log of one plus number of acquisitions (Log(1+Number
of Acquisitions)), and the log of average transaction size of acquisitions (Log (1+Average Deal Size)) at a
certain year. In Panel A, we present results from difference-in-difference analysis and in Panel B, we report
the dynamics of the litigation effects. After is a dummy variable that equals one after litigation year, and
zero before and including litigation year. Defendant is a dummy variable that equals one if firm is one of
defendants in litigation case, otherwise zero. Year and firm fixed effects are included. The variable t-1 year
is an indicator variable equal to one if the observation is recorded in the year preceding the litigation. t-3,
t-2, t+1, t+2, t+3 year are dummy variables defined analogously. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust
and adjusted for Case clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Panel A: Diff-in-Diff Analysis on Innovation Outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(1+Number of Log(1+Number of Log(1+Number Log(1+Average
Patent Application) Adj. Citations) of Total Acquisitions) Acquisition Size)
After X Defendant -0.35∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.45∗
(-5.63) (-3.53) (-2.48) (-1.85)
Defendant 0.13∗∗∗ 0.01 0.05∗∗ 0.29∗∗
(3.90) (1.47) (2.29) (2.04)
After 0.14∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.01 -0.00
(3.88) (1.85) (0.51) (-0.01)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,973 10,099 10,099 10,099
Adjusted R2 0.919 0.960 0.370 0.346
Panel B: Dynamic Effects on Innovation Outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(1+Number of Log(1+Number of Log(1+Number Log(1+Average
Patent Application) Adj. Citations) of Total Acquisitions) Acquisition Size)
t-3 year X Defendant 0.24∗∗ 0.03 -0.05 -0.25
(2.37) (1.54) (-0.56) (-0.54)
t-2 year X Defendant 0.27∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.27
(3.01) (2.70) (-0.31) (-0.61)
t-1 year X Defendant 0.22∗∗ 0.02 -0.04 -0.54
(2.43) (1.15) (-0.60) (-1.41)
t+1 year X Defendant -0.11 -0.01 -0.13∗∗ -0.60
(-1.16) (-0.76) (-2.22) (-1.55)
t+2 year X Defendant -0.18∗ -0.02 -0.09 -0.56
(-1.91) (-1.15) (-1.23) (-1.29)
t+3 year X Defendant -0.26∗∗ -0.02 -0.17∗∗ -0.99∗∗
(-2.36) (-1.49) (-2.30) (-2.37)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,973 10,099 10,099 10,099
Adjusted R2 0.920 0.960 0.371 0.348
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Table 2.5: Patent Litigation and Industry Outcome
The table examines the effect of patent litigation on industry-level product market competition outcome.
The sample comprises of all S&P 500 firms for the period of 2000-2006 at 3-digit SIC level. The dependent
variables are industry-level fluidity measure, industry median profitability, industry median R&D expense
scaled by total assets, the log of one plus the industry average adjusted citations received, and the log of
one plus the total number of firms in industry. The main independent variable is Log(1+#Ind. Defendant),
the log of one plus total number of patent litigations in a 3-digit SIC industry in a certain year. Rival firm
and year fixed effects are included. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Industry Analysis on Innovation Outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(1+Number of Log(1+Number of Exploitive Explorative
Patent Application) Adj. Citations)
Log(1+#Ind. Defendant) -0.20∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.01
(-6.97) (-4.66) (1.23) (-1.05)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,536 2,536 842 842
Adjusted R2 0.823 0.963 0.482 0.572
Panel B: Industry Analysis on External Innovation Outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(1+Number Log(1+Average Same Industry Log(1+Number Number of
of Total Deal) Deal Size) Acquisition of CVC Deal) Segments
Log(1+#Ind. Defendant) -0.01∗ -0.07 -0.00 -0.04∗∗∗ -0.02
(-1.69) (-0.89) (-0.08) (-3.10) (-0.52)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,536 2,536 2,536 2,536 2,083
Adjusted R2 0.372 0.171 0.171 0.706 0.788
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Table 2.6: The Effects of Patent Litigation: Propensity Matching Analysis
The table examines the effects of patent litigation on corporate internal and external innovation outcomes
using propensity score matching. The propensity score for being defendant is calculated based on firm-year
patent portfolio characteristics, Size, R&D expense, Profitability, Tangibility, Market/Book, and Industry
HHI. The sample comprises of all S&P 500 firms that had at least one patent litigation for the period of
2000-2006. In Panel A, the dependent variables are corporate financial policy: total cash scaled by total
assets (Cash), dividend payer dummy (Dividend), leverage ratio using book value of total debt (Leverage)),
assets growth rate (Asset growth), and the market share based on 3-digit SIC (Mkt Share). In Panel B, the
dependent variables are corporate innovation outcome: the log of one plus number of patent applications at a
certain year ((Log(1+Number of Patent Application)), the log of one plus adjusted citation (Log(1+Number
of Adj. Citations)), the log of one plus number of acquisitions (Log(1+Number of Acquisitions)), the log of
average transaction size of acquisitions (Log (1+Average Deal Size)) at a certain year. After is a dummy
variable that equals one after litigation year, and zero before and including litigation year. Defendant is a
dummy variable that equals one if firm is one of defendants in litigation case, otherwise zero. Year and firm
fixed effects are included. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted for Case clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Propensity Score Matching Analysis on Financial Outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash Dividend Dummy Leverage Asset growth Mkt Share
After X Defendant -0.01 -0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.08
(-0.89) (-2.96) (2.76) (-4.49) (-0.29)
Defendant 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.22
(2.94) (0.12) (-3.55) (3.13) (1.22)
After 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(0.65) (0.35) (0.20) (3.49) (3.50)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,023 5,023 5,023 5,023 5,023
Adjusted R2 0.873 0.838 0.636 0.168 0.955
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching Analysis on Innovation Outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(1+Number of Log(1+Number of Log(1+Number Log(1+Average
Patent Application) Adj. Citations) of Total Acquisitions) Acquisition Size)
After X Defendant -0.34∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.72∗∗∗
(-7.99) (-2.68) (-6.41) (-5.47)
Defendant 0.07∗∗ 0.00 0.08∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(2.58) (0.36) (5.74) (5.61)
After 0.23∗∗∗ 0.01 0.08∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(7.14) (1.42) (5.66) (4.91)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,974 4,974 4,974 4,974
Adjusted R2 0.942 0.955 0.397 0.353
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Table 2.7: The Effects of Patent Litigation: IV approach
The table examines the effects of patent litigation on corporate internal and external innovation outcomes
using instrument variable approach. We use China’s TRIPS participation in 2001 as an instrument and apply
a diff-in-diff estimation. The variable Post TRIPS takes the value of one after China’s TRIPS participation,
for firms that any of their competitors in the same industry have China exposure before 2001, and zero
otherwise. We restrict the sample period from t-2 to t+2 year around the litigation filing date. The sample
comprises of all S&P 500 firms that had at least one patent litigation for the period of 2000-2002. In Panel
A, column (1) presents the relation between our instrument and the probability of being a defendant. In
columns (2)-(5), the dependent variables are corporate financial outcome: Cash scaled by total assets (Cash),
dividend payer (Dividend Dummy), leverage ratio (Leverage), asset growth (Asset growth), and market share
(Market Share). In Panel B, the dependent variables are corporate innovation outcome and strategy: the
log of one plus number of acquisitions (Log(1+Number of Acquisitions)), the log of average transaction size
of acquisitions (Log (1+Average Deal Size)) at a certain year, and the dummy variable that equals one if
the acquisition is between the same industry (Same Industry Acquisition), the log of one plus number of
CVC transaction (Log(1+Number of CVC Deal)), the number of business segments (Number of Segments).
Case, year and firm fixed effects are included. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted for Case
clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Instrument Variable Analysis on Financial Policies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Defendant Cash Dividend Dummy Leverage Asset growth Market Share
Post TRIPS 0.05∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ -0.54∗∗∗ -0.84∗∗
(1.73) (-3.30) (4.40) (3.06) (-4.65) (-2.53)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746 1746
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.956 0.962 0.909 0.269 0.986
Panel B: Instrument Variable Analysis on Innovation Outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(1+Number of Log(1+Number of Log(1+Number Log(1+Average
Patent Application) Adj. Citations) of Total Acquisitions) Acquisition Size)
Post TRIPS -0.01 -0.03∗∗ 0.04 0.45
(-0.21) (-2.25) (0.61) (1.31)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383
Adjusted R2 0.968 0.988 0.263 0.224
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Table 2.8: The Effects of Patent Litigation on Financial Policies and Innovation: Intra- vs. Inter-industry
The table examines the effects of patent litigation on corporate financial, and innovation outcomes. We use sub-sample where cases are between
intra-industry rivals in Panel A and inter-industry firms in Panel B based on three-digit sic code. The sample comprises of all S&P 500 firms for the
period of 2000-2006 at litigation case level. After is a dummy variable that equals one after litigation year, and zero before and including litigation
year. Defendant is a dummy variable that equals one if firm is one of defendants in litigation case, otherwise zero. Year and firm fixed effects are
included. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted for Case clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
Panel A: Intra-Case Cases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash Dividend Dummy Leverage Log(1+Number Log(1+Number
of Patent Application) of Adj. Citations)
After X Defendant -0.02∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗ -0.03∗
(-1.93) (-5.45) (-3.99) (-2.51) (-1.68)
Defendant 0.01∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ -0.00
(1.79) (4.75) (3.07) (2.16) (-0.24)
After 0.01∗ 0.01 0.01∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ -0.01∗
(1.93) (0.93) (2.91) (2.95) (-1.72)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,020 2,020 2,020 2,020 2,020
Adjusted R2 0.915 0.816 0.804 0.956 0.965
Panel B: Inter-Case Cases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash Dividend Dummy Leverage Log(1+Number Log(1+Number
of Patent Application) of Adj. Citations)
After X Defendant 0.00 0.10∗∗ -0.00 -0.09 0.00
(0.30) (2.12) (-0.01) (-1.23) (0.34)
Defendant 0.00 -0.03∗∗ 0.00 0.04 0.00
(0.95) (-2.06) (0.19) (1.49) (0.29)
After 0.00 -0.01 0.01∗ 0.06 -0.01
(0.79) (-1.37) (1.85) (1.59) (-1.54)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848
Adjusted R2 0.930 0.880 0.813 0.944 0.981
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Table 2.9: The Effects of Patent Litigation: Innovation Strategy
The table examines the effects of patent litigation on corporate external innovation. The sample comprises
of 1,692 litigation cases that S&P 500 firm associated for the period of 2000-2006. For each litigation case,
we restrict the sample period from t-3 to t+3 year around the litigation filing date. In columns (1)-(5),
the dependent variables are corporate innovation outcome and strategy: the exploitive innovation measure
(Exploitive), the explorative innovation measure (Explorative)), the dummy variable that equals one if the
acquisition is between the same industry (Same Industry Acquisition), the log of one plus number of CVC
transaction (Log(1+Number of CVC Deal)), and the number of business segments (Number of Segments).
In Panel A, we present results from difference-in-difference analysis, and in Panel B, we report the dynamics
of the litigation effects. After is a dummy variable that equals one after litigation year, and zero before
and including litigation year. Defendant is a dummy variable that equals one if firm is one of defendants in
litigation case, otherwise zero. Year and firm fixed effects are included. The variable t-1 year is an indicator
variable equal to one if the observation is recorded in the year preceding the litigation. t-3, t-2, t+1, t+2,
t+3 year are dummy variables defined analogously. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted for
Case clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exploitive Explorative Same Industry Log(1+Number Number of
Acquisition of CVC Deal) Segments
After X Defendant 0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.35∗∗
(2.72) (-2.11) (3.27) (-2.22) (-2.31)
Defendant -0.01∗∗ 0.01 -0.02∗∗ 0.03 0.34∗∗∗
(-2.44) (1.64) (-2.49) (0.92) (3.63)
After -0.01∗ 0.01 -0.01∗ 0.01 0.22∗∗∗
(-1.84) (1.40) (-1.86) (0.31) (2.84)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,327 8,327 10,099 10,099 9,219
Adjusted R2 0.545 0.688 0.353 0.867 0.832
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Table 2.10: The Hedging Effects of Innovation Strategy on Patent Litigation
The table examines the effects of corporate innovation strategy on future patent litigation. We test whether
exploitive innovation strategy after a litigation in year t affects the likelihood of litigation in year t+ 1. The
sample comprises of all S&P 500 firms that had at least one patent litigation for the period of 2000-2006. The
dependent variables are the log of one plus number of defendant case in year t+ 1 (Log(1+num of defendant
case in t+1), the log of one plus total number of defendant case from t+ 1 to t+ 3 year (Log(1+total num
of defendant case within 3yrs), a dummy variable that equals one if firm is a defendant in any litigation
case in year t+ 1 (Defendant t+1), a dummy variable that equals one if firm is a defendant in any litigation
case within t+ 1 to t+ 3 year (Defendant within 3yrs). Exploitive t+1 is the exploitive innovation measure
(Exploitive) after in year t + 1. Defendant is a dummy variable that equals one if firm is one of defendants
in litigation case, otherwise zero. Year and firm fixed effects are included. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are
robust and adjusted for Case clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(1+num of Log(1+total num of Defendant t+1 Defendant
deft case in t+1) deft case within 3yrs) within 3yrs
Exploitive t+1 X Defendant -0.92∗ -1.31∗∗∗ -0.59∗∗ -0.70∗∗∗
(-1.92) (-3.49) (-2.00) (-2.79)
Exploitive t+1 -0.25 -0.35 -0.23 -0.20
(-1.17) (-1.21) (-1.46) (-0.98)
Defendant -0.07 -0.27∗∗∗ -0.05 -0.14∗∗∗
(-0.65) (-3.78) (-0.77) (-2.69)
Size 0.02 -0.12 0.03 -0.08
(0.25) (-0.90) (0.52) (-0.81)
R&D Exp. -0.30 -0.02 -0.20 0.00
(-0.66) (-0.03) (-0.65) (0.01)
Profitability 0.40 0.70 0.27 0.33
(1.06) (1.04) (1.26) (0.87)
Tangibility -0.04 -0.17 -0.00 -0.18
(-0.11) (-0.36) (-0.02) (-0.51)
Tobin’s Q 0.00 -0.00 0.00∗ -0.00
(1.53) (-0.30) (1.70) (-0.01)
CF Vol 0.40 0.65 0.26 0.27
(1.25) (1.06) (1.41) (0.94)
1 - HHI 0.36 0.52 0.80 0.90
(0.41) (0.40) (1.28) (1.10)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 756 756 756 756
Adjusted R2 0.207 0.645 0.163 0.530
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Figure A1: Geographic Distribution of Treated States and Patent-intensive States
The figures present the distribution of the treated states and patent-intensive industry employment to high-
light that the patent-intensive firms are not concentrated only in the treated states. Figure (a) shows where
the distribution of treated states. Figure (b) presents the states in which the fraction of employment from
patent-intensive industry is above national average (USPTO Intellectual Property and the U.S. Economy
Report, 2012) as of 2010. The comparison reinforces that the results are not driven by firms with relatively
greater innovation investment opportunities sorting into the treated states. The distribution of patent-
intensive firms are wider, but the effect of shift of property rights to employee invention is found only in the
firms located in treated states.
(a) Treated States
(b) IP-intensive Employment State
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Table A1: Falsification Test Using Non-patenting Firms
This table presents baseline results in Table 2 for non-patenting firms. The dependent variable in Columns
(1) and (2) is Total debt/Assets. The dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is LTD issuance. The odd-
numbered columns include firm and year fixed effects, and the even-numbered columns use more stringent
specification including firm and industry-year fixed effects. For variable definitions and further details of
their construction, see Appendix D. All standard errors are clustered by state.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total debt/Assets Total debt/Assets LTD issuance LTD issuance
treat×post 0.010 0.011 -0.001 -0.006
(0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007)
post -0.435∗∗ -0.151
(0.179) (0.180)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y – Y –
Industry-year FE N Y N Y
Observations 35,619 35,567 35,619 35,567
Adjusted R2 0.663 0.665 0.396 0.396
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
Table A2: Subsample with Single Subsidiary Location
The table reports the main regression results for subsample of firms operating in single or relatively limited
number of states. The dependent variable is Total debt/Assets. The geographic subsidiary data is from
Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock (2013). The data provides the count of geographic subsidiaries and the
corresponding states. Column (1) reports the result for firms with single operating location in the headquarter
state. Columns (2) and (3) report the results for firms with one or two geographic subsidiaries that may
be located outside the headquarter state, but certainly limited in geographic presence of the firm. All
specifications include firm and year fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered by state.
Total debt/Assetsit = α+ β1 treati × postt + δi + γt + it
(1) (2) (3)
Total debt/Assets Total debt/Assets Total debt/Assets
(Zero sub) (One sub) (Two subs)
treat×post 0.036∗ 0.033∗ 0.022∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.013)
Firm FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Observations 3,084 6,001 8,799
Adjusted R2 0.485 0.509 0.565
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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Table A3: Baseline Regression with Control Variables
This table presents baseline results with control variables. The dependent variable is Total debt/Assets. Each control variable dummy is equal to
one if the pre-treatment average is greater than median, otherwise zero. The control variables are included as dummy variables interacted with post
indicator. The stand-alone control variables are also included but absorbed by the firm fixed effects. Each control variable is static and computed
from the pre-treatment period median. For variable definitions and further details of their construction, see Appendix D. All standard errors are
clustered by state.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
treatXpost 0.025∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Size -0.011 -0.007
(0.011) (0.011)
Age 0.004 0.008
(0.008) (0.009)
State-tax 0.008 0.007
(0.010) (0.012)
Tangibility -0.004 -0.004
(0.008) (0.010)
Market-to-book 0.010 0.012
(0.008) (0.008)
Profitability -0.008 -0.005
(0.010) (0.009)
Pre-patent stock -0.000 0.000
(0.010) (0.000)
R&D expenditure -0.000 -0.009
(0.010) (0.008)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 16,540 15,027 16,540 16,540 16,540 16,540 16,540 16,540 15,027
Adjusted R2 0.610 0.611 0.610 0.610 0.610 0.610 0.610 0.610 0.611
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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Table A4: Pre-treatment State Economic Conditions
This table reports difference in means of state-level economic variable growth rates between treated states
and untreated states by year. For simplicity, I report two years before and after the 2008 CAFC court ruling,
but the differences in means are statistically insignificant for all sample years. The second and third column
report means of corresponding economic variable, and the last column reports p-values on the difference
in means. The objective of this table is to show that the difference-in-difference results are not driven by
differential trends in state-level economics variables. The differences in state-level economic variables are
small and are not statistically different from zero throughout my sample period.
Mean Comparison
Year Treated States Untreated States p-value
GDP growth, percent
2006 5.313 4.742 0.576
2007 1.450 2.969 0.331
2008 -1.487 −2.013 0.671
2009 2.862 4.273 0.107
2010 4.275 4.100 0.879
GDP per capita growth, percent
2006 2.425 1.691 0.384
2007 0.988 0.498 0.558
2008 -1.613 −0.495 0.316
2009 -3.650 −2.965 0.534
2010 0.400 1.477 0.183
Unemployment rate growth, percent
2006 -0.122 −0.083 0.188
2007 0.013 −0.016 0.332
2008 0.284 0.241 0.517
2009 0.637 0.569 0.306
2010 0.023 0.016 0.783
State corporate tax rate growth, percent
2006 0 −0.004 0.669
2007 0 −0.002 0.671
2008 0 0.034 0.706
2009 -0.005 0.002 0.555
2010 0 −0.002 0.613
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Table A5: State-level Aggregate Innovation
This table presents state-level aggregate innovation output. The dependent variable is 2-year lagged log
number of patent grants. I lagged the variable to account for the time it takes for firm’s underlying innovation
changes to take effects. I use all granted patents in USPTO Patent Grant data that are assigned to entities
in the US with role code 2 (US company or corporation), 4 (US individual), 6 (US Federal government), 8
(US county government), and 9 (US state government). Column (1) uses patents granted to corporations
(role code 2). Column (2) uses patents granted to all government (role code 6,8 and 9). Column (3) uses
patents granted to individuals (role code 4). Treat and Post indicators are defined as before. Treat is equal
to one if assignee state is in CA, DE, IL, NC, MN, MS, UT, or WA, zero otherwise. Post is one if on and
after 2008, zero otherwise. For variable definitions and further details of their construction, see Appendix
D. All standard errors are clustered by state.
(1) (2) (3)
log(1+grant) log(1+grant) log(1+grant)
Corporations Government Individuals-only
treatXpost 0.163∗ 0.040 0.089
(0.095) (0.072) (0.091)
Firm FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Observations 450 44 405
Adjusted R2 0.987 0.988 0.886
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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A.1 USPTO Patent Data Collection
US patent data is important part of the empirical analyses because I use the firm-level
patent characteristics, such as percentage of successful applications and patent citations, to
provide evidence for the increasing patent pledgeability mechanism. In this section, I briefly
describe the data collection process, and how I validate the data across different publicly
available patent data sources.
USPTO publicly provides a bulk data download through Reed Tech. The database keeps
patent application and patent grant data separately, and USPTO releases the data weekly
in XML data format. I first download these weekly files and parse each XML files to obtain
relevant information. The key information contained in each document is the assignee names,
assignee state, assignee country, and assignee role code. For each set of patent application
and patent grant data, I keep only documents with role code ”02,” which represents US
corporation assignee. Then using assignee state and country, I limit my sample to only ones
that are issued to US domicile US corporations. Next, I name-match the assignees to my
patenting sample firms from Compustat. I use multiple ways for name-matching, and also
verify with spot-checking with eyes given the number of sample firms is not too large.
Additionally, I performed validation of my data using existing sources. First, going
through the universe of US patents allows me to verify the claim that about 80-90% of
patentable inventions are created by the employee inventors (Cherensky 1993, Pisegna-Cook
1994, Gruner 2006). Consistent with these papers, using the role code categories, I verify
that the composition of patent assignees in my data is also mainly composed of corporations,
followed by individual and government. Second, I cross-checked with KPSS data (Kogan,
Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017)). KPSS is an excellent data source for patents.
However, there are few limitations with KPSS. One is that KPSS covers US patent data
from 1926 to November of 2010, whereas my sample period is over 2003-2013. The other is
that to measure the success rate of patent applications in the application year, I need to be
able to verify whether the applied patents are eventually granted. This requires for me to see
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grant data unto 2016, given it takes on average about two to three years for a patent to go
through the grant process. By using USPTO data, I can extend the patent data unto 2016
for computation purpose, and also use KPSS to cross-check my patent grant and citations
data for the overlapping period between 2003-2009. I first verified raw number of grant
documents parsed in each of KPSS and my dataset. For the period between 2003-2009, the
counts match about 99.9% for most of the years. In 2010, KPSS data stops in November
2nd, 2010. The count gap between KPSS and my data is about 15,000 granted patents,
which is plausible given the average number of patents granted each month. Lastly, I also
validated that the number of citations on overlapping firms during the common time period
is almost identical.
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A.2 Statutory Laws and Firm Headquarters
This section provides a few examples of cases to verify that pre-invention assignment agree-
ments are governed by state law where a firm’s headquarter is located. In the empirical
analysis, the a sample firm’s headquarter state is used to define the treatment indicator.
1. DDB Technologies, LLC v. MLB Advanced Media
• Case no. 04-CV-352, 2006.
• The initial case was heard in Western District of Texas.
• The involved inventions by David Barstow assigned to Schlumberger Technology
Corporation, whose headquarter is located in Texas.
2. Evan Brown v. Alcatel USA, Inc (F/N/A DSC Communications Corpora-
tion)
• Case no. 05-02-01678-CV, 2004.
• The case was heard in 199th Judicial District Court. Collin County, Texas.
• DSC Communications was a Texas-based phone equipment maker.
3. Banks v. Unisys Corporation and Burroughs Corporation
• Case no. 228 F.3d 1357, 2000.
• The case was initially heard in District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
• Gerald Banks and Kelly Banks were employed with Burroughs Corporation, now
wholly-owned by Unisys Corporation.
• Burroughs Corporation headquarter is located in Michigan.
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A.3 Variable Description
• Total debt/Assets = (Long-term debt (dltt) + Short-term debt (dlc))/ total assets.
The missing observations were replaced with zero, then the ratio is winsorized between
zero and one following Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008).
• LTD issuance = Long-term debt issuance (dltis)/(Total assetst−1). The missing
observations were replaced with zero, then the ratio is winsorized between zero and
one following Lemmon et al. (2008).
• Self-citation = A total number of citations on a firm’s own patents granted in the last
10 years by new applications. The median backward citation lag is around 10 years
(Hall et al. (2005))
• % successful app = (Total number of eventually granted patents)/(Total number of
patent applications submitted) X 100
• Firm age= Firm age is counted since date of incorporation obtained from Datastream.
• First 3-yr citations = Average number of total citations received during the first
3-years post-grant per patent.
• Avg. citations = Average annual number of citations received per existing patents
granted prior to treatment year.
• Portfolio Age= Average age of all existing patents in firm’s patent portfolio in the
year prior to the CAFC ruling.
• Patent Stock= The total number of all existing patents in firm’s patent portfolio in
the year prior to the CAFC ruling.
• % Self citation = Sum of all self citations divided by the total number of citations
made by new applications, then multiplied by 100.
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• Leverage growth = Average of annual growth of debt-to-assets ratio.
• Size growth = Average of annual growth of total assets.
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APPENDIX B
Patent Litigation and Innovation Competition
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Table B1: Determinant of Patent Litigation
The table examines the determinants of patent litigation probability. The sample comprises of all patents
(to be updated) in our sample period, 1976-2006. The dependent variable Litigation is the dummy variable
that equals to one if the firm is involved in a litigation at the given year. Firm, industry, and year fixed
effects are included. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted for firm clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Defendant Log(# Defendant) Intra-ind. case Log(# Intra-ind. Case) Inter-ind. case Log(# Inter-ind. Case)
Log(1+# Patent) -0.01 0.16∗∗∗ -1.20∗∗∗ 0.10∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(-0.13) (2.61) (-4.86) (1.70) (4.86) (8.51)
Log(1+# Adj. Citations) -0.77∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗ -1.01 0.91∗∗∗ 1.01 0.99∗∗∗
(-3.03) (-3.30) (-1.42) (5.46) (1.42) (4.38)
Log(1+# Adj. Citing) 0.84∗∗∗ 0.07 -0.07 -0.71∗∗∗ 0.07 -0.33∗∗
(3.76) (0.54) (-0.13) (-5.87) (0.13) (-2.11)
Portfolio Avg. Originality -4.46∗∗∗ -2.88∗∗∗ 3.37∗ 4.19∗∗∗ -3.37∗ 0.48
(-4.47) (-4.46) (1.72) (6.85) (-1.72) (0.61)
Log(Portfolio # Assignee) -1.12 1.30 36.67 -29.87∗∗∗ -36.67 -24.45∗∗∗
(-0.10) (0.29) (1.24) (-5.43) (-1.24) (-4.27)
Size 0.10 -0.12∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ -1.20∗∗∗ -0.58∗∗∗
(0.89) (-1.78) (5.27) (2.86) (-5.27) (-7.93)
Cash 0.81 0.60∗∗ -1.30 -0.06 1.30 -2.78∗∗∗
(1.61) (2.30) (-1.15) (-0.25) (1.15) (-10.18)
Leverage -1.53∗∗ -2.11∗∗∗ -3.71∗∗∗ -2.87∗∗∗ 3.71∗∗∗ -1.37∗∗∗
(-2.14) (-4.89) (-2.92) (-6.48) (2.92) (-3.29)
R&D Exp. 0.32 -0.96 17.61∗∗∗ 3.80∗∗∗ -17.61∗∗∗ -11.12∗∗∗
(0.17) (-0.86) (3.60) (3.57) (-3.60) (-9.19)
Profitability 0.81 1.50∗∗ -3.26 -0.40 3.26 0.15
(0.73) (2.19) (-1.51) (-0.54) (1.51) (0.18)
Tangibility -0.95∗ -1.31∗∗∗ 1.21 0.35 -1.21 -0.77∗∗
(-1.66) (-4.44) (1.22) (1.22) (-1.22) (-2.28)
Tobin’s Q -0.06 0.02 -0.18 -0.09∗∗∗ 0.18 0.03∗∗
(-0.98) (1.11) (-1.55) (-6.32) (1.55) (1.97)
CF Vol -1.61 -0.34 -0.96 -2.98∗∗ 0.96 -1.60
(-0.66) (-0.23) (-0.16) (-2.01) (0.16) (-0.91)
Dividend Dummy 0.18 0.07 1.17∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗
(1.15) (0.64) (3.46) (11.25) (-3.46) (-3.41)
1 - HHI 2.79 6.25∗∗ 0.17 3.91 -0.17 -0.81
(0.54) (2.52) (0.02) (1.54) (-0.02) (-0.32)
Ind. Med R&D 4.67 7.37∗∗ 7.59 -2.06 -7.59 -4.56
(0.75) (2.49) (0.50) (-0.69) (-0.50) (-1.48)
Ind. Med Q 0.20 -0.11 -2.89∗∗∗ -0.03 2.89∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗
(0.45) (-0.51) (-3.01) (-0.16) (3.01) (2.13)
Ind. Med Leverage 0.45 3.52∗∗∗ -5.31 0.87 5.31 -1.18
(0.14) (3.16) (-0.83) (0.91) (0.83) (-1.07)
Ind. Med Profitability 2.10 4.63∗∗∗ 3.09 -2.93 -3.09 0.24
(0.72) (3.30) (0.46) (-1.64) (-0.46) (0.15)
Ind Med Tangibility 7.40∗∗ 0.65 9.87∗ 6.23∗∗∗ -9.87∗ 1.33
(2.27) (0.47) (1.78) (4.75) (-1.78) (1.02)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,149 1,270 561 1,270 561 1270
Adjusted R2 0.496 0.773 0.615
Pseudo R2 0.183 0.443 0.443
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Table B2: The Effects of Patent Litigation: Financial Outcomes
The table examines the effects of patent litigation on corporate financial outcomes. The sample comprises
of 1,692 litigation cases that S&P 500 firm associated for the period of 2000-2006. For each litigation case,
we restrict the sample period from t − 2 to t + 2 year around the litigation filing date. In columns (1)-(5),
the dependent variables are corporate financial policy: total cash scaled by total assets (Cash), dividend
payer dummy (Dividend), leverage ratio using book value of total debt (Leverage)), assets growth rate
(Asset growth), and the market share based on 3-digit SIC (Mkt Share). t-statistics (in parenthesis) are
robust and adjusted for Case clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash Dividend Dummy Leverage Asset growth Market Share
After X Defendant -0.01∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗
(-2.98) (-2.95) (2.77) (-5.77) (2.54)
Defendant 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ -0.10
(2.90) (0.71) (-2.99) (6.93) (-1.50)
After 0.00∗ -0.00 0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(1.80) (-0.22) (0.37) (3.46) (3.15)
Size -0.01∗ 0.09∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ 3.72∗∗∗
(-1.92) (5.06) (-3.97) (-9.48) (13.16)
R&D Exp. -0.29∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 4.36∗∗∗
(-5.10) (4.66) (4.08) (7.40) (3.67)
Profitability -0.06∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.07 -0.36∗∗∗ 6.62∗∗∗
(-2.15) (2.60) (1.05) (-3.16) (8.52)
Tangibility 0.15∗∗∗ 0.05 -0.06∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ -1.64∗∗∗
(8.36) (1.13) (-2.60) (11.51) (-2.95)
Tobin’s Q -0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(-4.21) (2.96) (-4.07) (10.31) (4.53)
CF Vol 0.17∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.17 -0.98∗∗∗ 3.95∗∗∗
(5.05) (4.67) (1.17) (-6.77) (4.23)
1 - HHI -0.08 0.03 0.32∗∗∗ -0.10 -62.36∗∗∗
(-1.21) (0.20) (2.88) (-0.47) (-11.58)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,099 10,099 10,099 10,099 10,099
Adjusted R2 0.878 0.884 0.681 0.530 0.986
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Table B3: The Effects of Patent Litigation: Innovation Outcomes
The table examines the effects of patent litigation on corporate innovation outcomes. The sample comprises
of 1,692 litigation cases that S&P 500 firm associated for the period of 2000-2006. For each litigation case,
we restrict the sample period from t− 3 to t+ 3 year around the litigation filing date. In columns (1)-(4),
the dependent variables are corporate innovation outcome and strategy: the log of one plus number of
patent applications at a certain year ((Log(1+Number of Patent Application)), the log of one plus adjusted
citation (Log(1+Number of Adj. Citations)), the log of one plus number of acquisitions (Log(1+Number of
Acquisitions)), and the log of average transaction size of acquisitions (Log (1+Average Deal Size)) at a
given year. Defendant is a dummy variable that equals one if firm is one of defendants in litigation case,
otherwise zero. Year and firm fixed effects are included. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted
for Case clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(1+Number of Log(1+Number of Log(1+Number Log(1+Average
Patent Application) Adj. Citations) of Total Acquisitions) Acquisition Size)
After X Defendant -0.35∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗
(-9.88) (-5.61) (-4.65) (-3.76)
Defendant 0.13∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(6.70) (2.72) (4.60) (4.71)
After 0.14∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.04
(6.35) (3.24) (0.29) (-0.76)
Size 0.38∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗
(8.31) (-8.52) (8.18) (7.54)
R&D Exp. 2.32∗∗∗ 0.05 -1.12∗∗∗ -7.19∗∗∗
(5.10) (1.00) (-5.37) (-6.93)
Profitability 0.93∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 3.10∗∗∗
(5.14) (-6.13) (6.60) (6.78)
Tangibility 0.53∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 5.70∗∗∗
(4.19) (-2.66) (12.31) (14.08)
Tobin’s Q -0.00 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ -0.01
(-0.43) (8.62) (2.70) (-1.15)
CF Vol 0.84∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 3.12∗∗
(1.91) (2.37) (2.68) (2.27)
1 - HHI -0.67 -0.36∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 2.16
(-1.31) (-4.07) (3.73) (1.34)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,973 10,099 10,099 10,099
Adjusted R2 0.921 0.965 0.395 0.372
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Table B4: The Effects of Patent Litigation: Innovation Strategy
The table examines the effects of patent litigation on corporate external innovation. The sample comprises
of 1,692 litigation cases that S&P 500 firm associated for the period of 2000-2006. For each litigation case,
we restrict the sample period from t-3 to t+3 year around the litigation filing date. In columns (1)-(5),
the dependent variables are corporate innovation outcome and strategy: the exploitive innovation measure
(Exploitive), the explorative innovation measure (Explorative)), the dummy variable that equals one if the
acquisition is between the same industry (Same Industry Acquisition), the log of one plus number of CVC
transaction (Log(1+Number of CVC Deal)), and the number of business segments (Number of Segments).
After is a dummy variable that equals one after litigation year, and zero before and including litigation
year. Defendant is a dummy variable that equals one if firm is one of defendants in litigation case, otherwise
zero. Year and firm fixed effects are included. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted for Case
clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exploitive Explorative Same Industry Log(1+Number Number of
Acquisition of CVC Deal) Segments
After X Defendant 0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.05 -0.10∗∗ -0.33∗∗
(5.28) (-3.73) (1.20) (-2.29) (-2.24)
Defendant -0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ -0.02 0.03 0.32∗∗∗
(-5.20) (2.97) (-0.85) (1.04) (3.53)
After -0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ -0.02 0.01 0.22∗∗∗
(-3.72) (2.17) (-1.42) (0.41) (2.96)
Size -0.01 0.03∗ 0.03 0.07 0.44∗
(-0.83) (1.93) (0.43) (0.99) (1.85)
R&D Exp. -0.33∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ -0.47 1.06∗ 3.90∗∗
(-4.64) (2.76) (-0.90) (1.92) (2.01)
Profitability 0.24∗∗∗ 0.05 0.60 -0.44 -2.87∗∗
(4.80) (1.26) (1.21) (-1.22) (-2.10)
Tangibility -0.17∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.27 0.68∗ 0.58
(-5.61) (4.17) (1.03) (1.72) (0.66)
Tobin’s Q -0.00 0.00∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.01 0.01
(-1.51) (2.49) (1.66) (0.64) (0.25)
CF Vol 0.11∗ -0.02 -0.03 -0.29 -1.70
(1.90) (-0.44) (-0.06) (-0.62) (-1.11)
1 - HHI -0.50∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗ 0.29 1.32 5.88∗
(-3.37) (-2.19) (0.51) (1.31) (1.96)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,327 8,327 10,099 10,099 9,219
Adjusted R2 0.554 0.691 0.436 0.869 0.837
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Table B5: The Effects of Patent Litigation: Innovation Strategy by Year
The table examines the effects of patent litigation on corporate innovation. The sample comprises of
1,692 litigation cases that S&P 500 firm associated for the period of 2000-2006. For each litigation case,
we restrict the sample period from t − 3 to t + 3 year around the litigation filing date. In Panel A, the
dependent variables are the log of one plus number of patent applications at a certain year ((Log(1+Number
of Patent Application)). In Panel B, the dependent variables are the log of one plus adjusted citation
(Log(1+Number of Adj. Citations)). In Panel C, the dependent variables are the log of one plus number
of patent applications at a certain year ((Log(1+Number of Patent Grant)). In columns (1)-(3), we present
results from difference-in-difference analysis with the dependent variables in t+ 1, t+ 2, and t+ 3 year after
litigation. After is a dummy variable that equals one after litigation year, and zero before and including
litigation year. Defendant is a dummy variable that equals one if firm is one of defendants in litigation case,
otherwise zero. Year and firm fixed effects are included. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are robust and adjusted
for Case clustering. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Log(1+Number of Patent Application)
(1) (2) (3)
After X Defendant -0.27∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗ -0.01
(-4.05) (-2.22) (-0.16)
Defendant 0.08∗∗ 0.03 -0.04
(2.43) (0.84) (-1.29)
After 0.05 -0.04 -0.03
(1.33) (-1.33) (-1.08)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,457 8,659 7,597
Adjusted R2 0.913 0.905 0.912
Panel B: Log(1+Number of Adj. Citations)
(1) (2) (3)
After X Defendant -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.01
(-3.35) (-2.56) (-1.25)
Defendant 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.99) (0.12) (-0.72)
After 0.01 0.00 0.00
(1.63) (0.94) (0.24)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,327 8,327 10,099
Adjusted R2 0.554 0.691 0.436
Panel C: Log(1+Number of Patent Grant)
(1) (2) (3)
After X Defendant -0.12∗∗ -0.12∗∗ -0.13∗∗
(-2.32) (-2.40) (-2.51)
Defendant 0.07∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.04∗
(2.56) (2.25) (1.66)
After 0.03 -0.02 -0.02
(0.83) (-0.75) (-0.92)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,940 9,478 8,757
Adjusted R2 0.887 0.885 0.890100
B.1 Case Example
Symbol Technologies v. Proxim
In December 2001, Symbol Technologies filed suit against Proxim for patent infringement.
Symbol Technologies and Proxim were direct competitors wireless networking equipment for
Wi-Fi and broadband wireless networks industry. The asserted patents in the litigation
entailed a power saving feature in wireless local area network (“WLAN”) communication
protocols. During the trial, the jury found that Proxim’s OpenAir products and 802.11
products infringed Symbol’s patents. Around the time when Symbol’s patents were granted
between 1991 and 1995, Proxim began selling the OpenAir products under the RangeLAN2
name in 1994. Symbol’s infringement expert had performed infringement analysis for the
OpenAir products, but without joining Proxim’s Wireless LAN Interoperability Forum, could
not further determine direct infringement without Proxim’s protocol and source code.
As a defense against patent infringement suit, Proxim contended that it is entitled to
the defense of laches, arguing Symbol Technologies sustained both economic and evidentiary
prejudice as a result of Symbol’s unreasonable delay in bringing suit. However, Proxim
failed to bring evidence that demonstrates Symbol had actual knowledge of Proxim’s in-
fringing activities and that Symbol Technologies failed on duty to inquire. As a result, in
lieu of permanent injunction, Symbol Technologies was awarded a six percent royalty on
sales of infringing products by Proxim in amount of $22,865,477 and damages in amount of
$3,052,192, adding to approximately $26 million.
After the ordering of royalty and damages in July 2004, Proxim shortly announced that
it plans to pay Symbol $22.75 million over the next two and a half years, starting with the
quarter that ended September 30th. In a quarterly SEC filing in 2004, Proxim noted that
“...we may be subject to significant and immediate liabilities in connection with our patent
litigation case with Symbol Technologies, Inc. (“Symbol”) which exceed our current cash
resources.” Proxim also warned that a large patent award to Symbol combined with diffi-
culties in refinancing its Bridge Notes could force the company to “seek protection under
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applicable bankruptcy laws.” Proxim was eventually acquired in 2005 by Terabeam Inc.1
Johnson & Johnson v. Boston Scientific
Johnson & Johnson and Boston Scientific’s long history of myriad patent disputes date
back to 2003. The asserted patent technology is used in making coronary artery stents. The
market for coronary artery stents has grown into a $6.5 billion worldwide business in which
profit margins can near 80 percent. Boston Scientific enjoyed a huge success, generating
$2 billion sales, from Taxus stent introduced in the stents market dominated by the mar-
ket pioneer, Cypher by Johnson & Johnson. Quickly, Boston Scientific became Johnson &
Johnson’s biggest rival in the stents market.
However, by 2005, a series of courtroom battles with Johnson & Johnson raised concerns
by the stock market of Boston Scientific’s ability to enhance Taxus line for further sales and
casted doubt on the company’s financial health from continuing legal expenses. The media
and market analysts particularly expressed concerns with Johnson & Johnson’s potential
strategy of using appeals and cases to drag on the patent dispute given its size and financial
flexibility to hurt Boston Scientific financially even more than by collecting royalties. In
2006, Johnson & Johnson acquires Conor Medsystems that uses paclitaxel, the drug that
stent patent litigation centers on. The market viewed that Johnson & Johnson’s deep pock-
ets and long experience with stent litigation could strengthen Conor’s legal position, and
Boston Scientific’s shares fell on the news of Johnson’s and Johnson’s acquisition of Conor.
The final blow on Boston Scientific came in 2010. Since 2003, Boston Scientific settled
17 lawsuits with Johnson & Johnson, and it finally settled on the on going patent litigation
on stent by paying Johnson & Johnson $1.7 billion, which is the largest sum ever paid to
resolve patent litigation over medical device. Even though Ray Elliot, president and chief
executive of Boston Scientific, assured the market of Boston Scientific’s resilience and ability
1See following sources for further information on Proxim’s patent litigation news reports.
https://www.law360.com/telecom/articles/2166/proxim-pays-23m-to-settle-symbol-s-wlan-patent-suit;
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE5DD1E30F936A2575AC0A9629C8B63&mcubz=0;
http://www.proxim.com/about-us/investor-information/investor-faqs
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to manage the payments with some financial flexibility, the market and industry analysts
suggested that the settlement’s size would sharply curtail the company’s ability to make
major acquisitions in the near future or force the company to undergo layoffs. Consistent
with the market’s view, Boston Sceintific announced layoff plans during the same month,
apparently due to large impairment charges and legal bills including payments to Johnson
& Johnson.2
2See following sources for further information on Johnson & Johnson and Boston Scientific patent disputes.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CEED9173EF93AA3575BC0A9639C8B63&pagewanted=
all&pagewanted=print; http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/18/business/18stent.html;
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/business/04patent.html;
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/business/02device.html;
http://www.massdevice.com/update-boston-scientific-lay-1300-q4-2009-sales-rise-losses-narrow/.
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